



# GINI

## INEQUALITY DECOMPOSITIONS

*Frank A. Cowell and Carlo V. Fiorio*

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GROWING INEQUALITIES' IMPACTS

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# Inequality Decompositions

## A Reconciliation


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
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
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




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


# Abstract

We show how classic source-decomposition and subgroup-decomposition methods can be reconciled with regression methodology used in the recent literature. We also highlight some pitfalls that arise from uncritical use of the regression approach. The LIS database is used to compare the approaches using an analysis of the changing contributions to inequality in the United States and Finland

Keywords: inequality, decomposition

JEL Classification: D63









# 1. Introduction

What is the point of decomposing income inequality and how should we do it? For some researchers the questions resolve essentially to a series of formal propositions that characterise a particular class of inequality measures. For others the issues are essentially pragmatic: in the same way as one attempts to understand the factors underlying, say, wage discrimination (Blinder 1973) one is also interested in the factors underlying income inequality and it might seem reasonable to use the same sort of applied econometric method of investigation. Clearly, although theorists and pragmatists are both talking about the components of inequality, they could be talking about very different things. We might even wonder whether they are on speaking terms.

The worry is that the standard theoretical approach, that employs a priori reasoning, and recent empirical approaches, that employ an application of regression analysis, are founded upon independent and possibly conflicting bases. Could they therefore provide conflicting messages to researchers and policy makers? However, although the main strands of literature on inequality decomposition have developed separately, this does not mean that they are necessarily inconsistent. It could be the case that at the core of each of the approaches there is an essential common element that can be used to establish a relationship between the principal approaches - the “reconciliation” mentioned in our title. In this paper we show how the two main methods of decomposition analysis (that are often treated as entirely separate) can be developed within a common analytical framework. We investigate regression-based techniques that are commonly used in empirical applications in various fields of economics and show how the methodology required for this can be derived from the a priori approach to factor- and source-decomposition. We apply these techniques to data from the Luxembourg Income Study to illustrate how the reconciliation works in practice.

The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 offers an overview of the decomposition literature. Our basic model is developed in section 3 and this is developed into a treatment of factor-source decomposition and subgroup decomposition in sections 4 and 5 respectively. Section 6 provides the empirical application, Section 7 discusses related literature and Section 8 concludes.





## 2. Approaches to decomposition

The two main strands of inequality-decomposition analysis that we mentioned in the introduction could be broadly labelled as “*a priori* approaches” and “regression models.”

### 2.1. *A priori* approaches

Underlying this approach is the essential question “what is meant by inequality decomposition?” The answer to this question is established through an appropriate axiomatisation.

This way of characterising the problem is perhaps most familiar in terms of decomposition by subgroups. A coherent approach to subgroup decomposition essentially requires (1) the specification of a collection of admissible partitions - ways of dividing up the population into mutually exclusive and exhaustive subsets - and (2) a concept of representative income for each group. Requirement (1) usually involves taking as a valid partition any arbitrary grouping of population members, although other specifications also make sense (Ebert 1988); requirement (2) is usually met by taking subgroup-mean income as being representative of the group, although other representative income concepts have been considered (Blackorby et al. 1981; Foster and Shneyerov 1999, 2000; Lasso de la Vega and Urrutia 2005, 2008). A minimal requirement for an inequality measure to be used for decomposition analysis is that it must satisfy a subgroup consistency or aggregability condition - if inequality in a component subgroup increases then this implies, *ceteris paribus*, that inequality overall goes up (Shorrocks 1984, 1988); the “*ceteris paribus*” clause involves a condition that the subgroup-representative incomes remain unchanged. This allows one to screen out some inequality measures that do not even satisfy the minimal requirement (Cowell 1988), but one can go further. By imposing more structure -i.e. further conditions -on the decomposition method one can derive particular inequality indices with convenient properties (Bourguignon 1979, Cowell 1980, Shorrocks 1980), a consistent procedure for accounting for inequality trends (Jenkins 1995) and an exact decomposition method that can be applied for example to regions (Yu et al. 2007) or to the world income distribution (Sala-i-Martin 2006). By using progressively finer partitions it is possible to apply the subgroup-decomposition approach to a method of accounting for the contributory factors to inequality (Cowell and Jenkins 1995, Elbers et al. 2008).

The *a priori* approach is also applicable to the other principal type of decomposability - the break-down by factor-source (Paul 2004, Shorrocks 1982, 1983, Theil 1979). As we will see the formal requirements for factor-source decomposition are straightforward and the decomposition method in practice has a certain amount in

common with decomposition by population subgroups. Furthermore the linear structure of the decomposition (given that income components sum to total income) means that the formal factor-source problem has elements in common with the regression-analysis approach that we review in Section 2.2.

## 2.2. An integrated approach?

It is evident that, with some care in modelling and interpretation, the a priori method can be developed from an exercise in logic to an economic tool that can be used to address important questions that are relevant to policy making. One can use the subgroup-decomposition method to assign importance to personal, social or other characteristics that may be considered to affect overall inequality. The essential step involves the way that between-group inequality is treated which, in turn, focuses on the types of partition that are considered relevant. One has to be careful: the fact that there is a higher between-group component for decomposition using partition A rather than partition B does not necessarily mean that A has more significance for policy rather than B (Kanbur 2006). However, despite this caveat, it is clear that there should be some connection between the between-group/within-group breakdown in the Section 2.1 approach and the explained/unexplained variation in the Section 2.2 approach.

We want to examine this connection using a fairly basic model.



### 3. Basic model

To make progress it is necessary focus on the bridge between formal analysis and the appropriate treatment of data. Hence we introduce the idea of data generating process (DGP), i.e. the joint probability distribution that is supposed to characterize the entire population from which the data set has been drawn.

Consider a set of random variables  $\mathbf{H}$  with a given joint distribution  $F(\mathbf{H})$ , where  $\mathbf{H}$  is partitioned into  $[Y, \mathbf{X}]$  and  $\mathbf{X} := (X_1, X_2, \dots, X_K)$ . Assume that we aim to model  $Y$  as a function of  $\mathbf{X}$  and a purely random disturbance variable  $U$  and that we can write the relation in an explicit form with  $Y$  as function of  $(\mathbf{X}, U)$

$$Y = f(\mathbf{X}, U|\boldsymbol{\beta}) \quad (1)$$

where  $\boldsymbol{\beta} := (\beta_1, \dots, \beta_K)'$  is a vector of parameters. For example, we could think of  $Y$  as individual income, of  $\mathbf{X}$  as a set of observable individual characteristics, such as age, sex, education, and of  $U$  as an unobservable random variable such as ability or luck.

For simplicity let us assume that the DGP takes a linear form and that the number of observable characteristics is  $k$ . Hence, we can write:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_k X_k + U \quad (2)$$

Typically one observes a random sample of size  $n$  from  $F(\mathbf{H})$ ,

$$\{(y_i, \mathbf{x}_i) = (y_i, x_{1i}, \dots, x_{ki}), i = 1, \dots, n\},$$

where the observations are independent over  $i$ . One then generates predictions of income for assigned values of individual characteristics using regression methods to compute a vector  $\mathbf{b}$ , as an estimate of  $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ . The true marginal distribution function of each random variable, which might be either continuous or discrete, is often unknown in economic applications, as data do not come from laboratory experiments, and one only knows the empirical distribution functions (EDF). The sample analogue of model (2) can be written as:

$$y = \beta_0 + \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_k x_k + v,$$

where  $v$  is the residual term. Provided that the standard assumptions such as exogenous covariates and spherical error variance hold, one could use OLS methods to estimate the income model<sup>1</sup> obtaining

$$y = b_0 + \sum_{k=1}^K b_k x_k + u, \quad (3)$$

where  $b_k$  is the OLS estimate of  $\beta_k$ ,  $k = 0, \dots, K$ ,  $u = y - b_0 - \sum_{k=1}^K b_k x_k$  is the OLS residual.

<sup>1</sup> We use a standard OLS regression for simplicity of exposition. Other regression methods that employ a distance metric taken from an inequality index could also be used (Olkin and Yitzhaki 1992).

Using the upper case letter for denoting a random variable (whose distribution function is not known in typical survey settings) and the lower case letter for denoting a size- $n$  random sample from the same distribution function, the mean and inequality function of  $Y$  are denoted by  $\mu(Y)$  and  $I(Y)$ , the mean and the inequality statistics (i.e. functions of the data) with  $\mu(y) = \mu(y_1, \dots, y_n)$  and  $I(y) = I(y_1, \dots, y_n)$ .

We can analyse the structure of the inequality of  $y$  (or of  $Y$ ) in two different ways

- *Subgroup decomposition.* Suppose that a subset  $T \subseteq \{1, \dots, K\}$  of the observables consists of discrete variables such that  $x_k$  ( $X_k$ ) can take the values  $\xi_{kj}$ ,  $j = 1, \dots, t_k$  where  $k \in T$  and  $t_k$  is the number of values (categories) that can logically be taken by the  $k$ th discrete observable. Then in this case we could perform a decomposition by population subgroups, where the subgroups are determined by the  $t$  categories, where  $t := \prod_{k \in T} t_k$ . This decomposition could be informative - what you get from the within-group component is an aggregate of the amount of inequality that is attributable to the dispersion of the unobservable  $v(U)$  and the remaining continuous observables  $x_k$ ,  $k \notin T$  ( $X_k$ ,  $k \notin T$ ). If all the observables were discrete the within-group component would be an aggregation of  $I_{y|x}$  ( $I_{Y|X}$ ) and the between-group component would give the amount of inequality that would arise if there were no variation in  $v(U)$ .
- *factor-source decomposition.* We can also interpret (2) as the basis for inequality by factor source expressing  $I(Y)$  in terms of component incomes  $C_1, \dots, C_{K+1}$ , where

$$C_k := \beta_k X_k, k = 1, \dots, K \quad (4)$$

$$C_{K+1} := U \quad (5)$$

Notice that the constant term  $\beta_0$  does not contribute to  $I(y)$  and similarly, if one adds or subtract an arbitrary constant to or from a regressor this will only change the constant with no effect on total inequality. For more details, see section 4 below.


The application of these decomposition methods has been criticised on a number of grounds. Subgroup decomposition is criticised because it requires partitioning the population into discrete categories although some factors (for example, age) are clearly continuous variables. Moreover, handling more than very few subgroups at the same time can be cumbersome. The factor-source decomposition presented in the Shorrocks (1982) form presents the useful property of being invariant to the inequality measure adopted,<sup>2</sup> however it can be criticised as being limited to a natural decomposition rule where total income is the sum of different types of income (for example pension, employment income and capital income). The subgroup and factor-source decomposition methods are sometimes criticised as being purely descriptive rather than analytical and as being irreconcilable

<sup>2</sup> Actually in some situations this might be regarded as a shortcoming, especially when the change of inequality can have a different sign depending on the inequality measure adopted.




one with another. Moreover they are tools which are often not well known in some fields of economics where the main focus is on the determinants of income or the market price of personal characteristics, which are estimated as the OLS coefficient in a Mincer-type wage regression.

The two decomposition methods - by population subgroup and by factor source - can be shown to be related to each other. This can be conveniently done using the model that we have just introduced.







## 4. Decomposition by factor source

Equation (2) is analogous to the case analysed by Shorrocks (1982) where income is the sum of income components (such as labour income, transfers and so on). The inequality of total income,  $I(Y)$ , can be written using a natural decomposition rule such as:

$$I(Y) = \sum_{k=1}^{K+1} \Theta_k \quad (6)$$

where  $\Theta_k$  depends on  $C_k$  and can be regarded as the contribution of factor  $k$  to overall income inequality. Define also the proportional contribution of factor  $k$  to inequality

$$\theta_k := \frac{\Theta_k}{I(Y)}.$$

Using (4) and (5) the results in Shorrocks (1982) yield:

$$\theta_k = \frac{\sigma(C_k, Y)}{\sigma^2(Y)} = \frac{\sigma^2(C_k)}{\sigma^2(Y)} + \sum_{j \neq k}^{K+1} \rho(C_k, C_j) \frac{\sigma(C_k)\sigma(C_j)}{\sigma^2(Y)}, k = 1, \dots, K+1$$

where  $\sigma(X) := \sqrt{\text{var}(X)}$ ,  $\sigma(X, Y) := \text{cov}(X, Y)$  and  $\rho(C_i, C_j) := \text{corr}(C_i, C_j)$ .

Since  $\sigma(\beta_k X_k, Y) = \beta_k \sigma(X_k, Y)$  we have:

$$\theta_k = \beta_k^2 \frac{\sigma^2(X_k)}{\sigma^2(Y)} + \sum_{j \neq k}^{K+1} \beta_k \beta_j \frac{\sigma(X_k, X_j)}{\sigma^2(Y)} + \beta_k \frac{\sigma(X_k, U)}{\sigma^2(Y)} \quad (7)$$

from which we obtain

$$\theta_k = \beta_k^2 \frac{\sigma^2(X_k)}{\sigma^2(Y)} + \sum_{j \neq k}^{K+1} \beta_k \beta_j \rho(X_k, X_j) \frac{\sigma(X_j)\sigma(X_k)}{\sigma^2(Y)} + \beta_k \rho(X_k, U) \frac{\sigma(X_k)\sigma(U)}{\sigma^2(Y)}, \quad (8)$$

for  $k = 1, \dots, K$  and

$$\theta_{K+1} = \frac{\sigma^2(U)}{\sigma^2(Y)} + \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_k \rho(X_k, U) \frac{\sigma(X_k)\sigma(U)}{\sigma^2(Y)}. \quad (9)$$

Replacing  $\beta_k$  by its OLS estimate ( $b_k$ ), and variances, covariances and correlation by their unbiased sample analogues, the estimate of  $\theta_k$ , ( $z_k$ ), can be obtained. A similar approach was followed by Fields (2003). Equations (8)-(9) provide a simple and intuitive interpretation and allow one to discuss the contribution of the value of characteristic  $k$ ,  $C_k$ , to inequality  $I(y)$ . If we impose more structure on the problem, by assuming that there is no multicollinearity among regressors and all regressors are non-endogenous ( $C_j, C_r) = 0, j \neq r$

and  $j, r = 1, \dots, K, K + 1$ ), then (7) can be simplified to

$$\theta_k = \begin{cases} \beta_k^2 \frac{\sigma^2(X_k)}{\sigma^2(Y)}, & k = 1, \dots, K \\ \frac{\sigma^2(U)}{\sigma^2(Y)}, & k = K + 1 \end{cases} \quad (10)$$

and it can be estimated as

$$z_k = \begin{cases} b_k^2 \frac{\sigma^2(x_k)}{\sigma^2(y)}, & k = 1, \dots, K \\ \frac{\sigma^2(u)}{\sigma^2(y)}, & k = K + 1 \end{cases} \quad (11)$$

where  $\sigma^2(x_k), \sigma^2(y), \sigma^2(u)$  stand for the unbiased sample variance of  $x_k, y, u$ , respectively. The sample analogue of the inequality decomposition as in (6) can be written as:

$$I(y) = \sum_{k=1}^{K+1} Z_k = \sum_{k=1}^{K+1} I(y) z_k = \sum_{k=1}^K I(y) b_k^2 \frac{\sigma^2(x_k)}{\sigma^2(y)} + I(y) \frac{\sigma^2(u)}{\sigma^2(y)}. \quad (12)$$

With some simplification, the right-hand-side of equation (12) might be interpreted as the sum of the effects of the  $K$  characteristics and of the error term, although one should consider it as the sum of the *total value* of the  $K$  characteristics, i.e. the product of its “price” of each component as estimated in the income regression ( $b_k, k = 1, \dots, K$ ) and its quantity ( $x_k, k = 1, \dots, K$ ). One should also notice that the standard errors of (12) are not trivial to compute as they involve the ratio of variances of random variables coming from a joint distribution and the variance of inequality indices can be rather cumbersome to derive analytically (see for instance Cowell 1989). Simulation methods such as the bootstrap are suggested for derivation of standard errors of (12), although they are not presented for the empirical analysis which follows.

Equation (7) shows that  $\theta_k$  ( $k = 1, \dots, K$ ) can only be negative if

$$\beta_k (\sum_{j \neq k} \beta_j \sigma(X_k, X_j) + \sigma(X_k, U)) < -\beta_k^2 \sigma^2(X_k), k = 1, \dots, K$$

for which a necessary condition is that there be either a nonzero correlation among RHS variables or at least one endogenous RHS variable.

It should be noted here that the decomposition (6) applies for natural decompositions only, i.e. if the LHS variable can be represented as a sum of factors. In the labour-economics literature it is customary to estimate a

log-linear relation, such as

$$\log(y) = b_0 + \sum_{k=1}^K b_k x_k + u$$

based on theoretical models of human capital, arguments of better regression fit, or error properties. In this case, the decomposition (6) can only be undertaken with  $I(\log(y))$  on the LHS.



## 5. Decomposition by population subgroups

Let us now assume that  $X_1$  is a discrete random variable that can take only a finite number of values  $\{j = 1, \dots, t_1\}$ . Let  $X_{k,j} := \iota \cdot X_k$ , where  $\iota$  is an indicator function which is equal to one if  $X_1 = j$  and it is equal to zero otherwise. Equation (2) can be represented for each sub-group  $j$  as:

$$Y_j = \beta_{0,j} + \beta_{1,j}X_{1,j} + \sum_{k=2}^K \beta_{k,j}X_{k,j} + U_j \quad (13)$$

Define  $P_j = \Pr(X_1 = X_{1,j})$ , the proportion of the population for which  $X_1 = X_{1,j}$ . Then within-group inequality can be written as

$$I_w(Y) = \sum_{j=1}^{t_1} W_j I(Y_j), \quad (14)$$

where  $t_1$  is the number of groups considered,  $W_j$  is a weight that is a function of the  $P_j$ , and  $Y_j$ . The decomposition by population subgroups allows one to write:

$$I(Y) = I_b(Y) + I_w(Y), \quad (15)$$

where  $I_b$  is between-group inequality, implicitly defined by (14) and (15) as

$$I_b(Y) := I(Y) - \sum_{j=1}^{t_1} W_j I(Y_j).$$

In the case of the Generalised Entropy (GE) indices we have, for any  $\alpha \in (-\infty, \infty)$

$$W_j = P_j \left[ \frac{\mu(Y_j)}{\mu(Y)} \right]^\alpha = R_j^\alpha P_j^{1-\alpha}, \quad (16)$$

where  $R_j := P_j \mu(Y_j) / \mu(Y)$  is the income share of group  $j$ ,  $\mu(Y_j)$  is mean income for subgroup  $j$ ,  $\mu(Y)$  is mean income for the whole population; we also have

$$I(Y) = \frac{1}{\alpha^2 - \alpha} \left[ \int \left[ \frac{Y}{\mu(Y)} \right]^\alpha dF(Y) - 1 \right], \quad (17)$$

from which we obtain

$$I_w(Y) = \frac{1}{\alpha^2 - \alpha} \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{t_1} P_j \left[ \frac{\mu(Y_j)}{\mu(Y)} \right]^\alpha \int \left[ \frac{Y_j}{\mu(Y_j)} \right]^\alpha dF(Y_j) - 1 \right] \quad (18)$$

and

$$I_b(Y) = \frac{1}{\alpha^2 - \alpha} \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{t_1} P_j \left[ \frac{\mu(Y_j)}{\mu(Y)} \right]^\alpha - 1 \right]. \quad (19)$$

Let us now see how decomposition by population subgroups could be adapted to an approach which uses the estimated DGP. Assuming that all standard OLS conditions are fulfilled, and using a  $n$ -size random sample

$\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_k$  from the joint distribution function  $F(Y, X_1, \dots, X_k)$  one can estimate equation (13) by using dummy variables for identifying different groups obtaining:

$$\sum_{k=2}^K b_{kj} x_{k,j} + u_j \quad (20)$$

where  $b_{0,j}$  are OLS estimates of  $\beta_0 + \beta_{1,j}\mu(x_{1,j})$  in subsample  $j$  and  $u_j$  are the OLS residuals of each group.

Given the OLS assumptions, the unbiasedness property of OLS estimates allows one to write the mean of  $y_j$  in (20) as  $\mu(y_j) = b_{0,j} + \sum_{k=2}^K b_{k,j}\mu(x_{k,j})$ .

The estimated between-group inequality  $\hat{I}_b$  can then be written as:

$$I_b(y) = \frac{1}{\alpha^2 - \alpha} \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{t_1} p_j \left[ \frac{b_{0,j} + \sum_{k=2}^K b_{k,j}\mu(x_{k,j})}{b_0 + \sum_{k=1}^K b_k\mu(x_k)} \right]^\alpha - 1 \right] \quad (21)$$

where  $p_j := n_j/n$  is the population share and  $n_j$  is the size of group  $j$ . The estimated within-group inequality, using (12) to decompose  $\hat{I}(y_j)$ , is written as:

$$I_w(y) = \sum_{j=1}^{t_1} w_j I(y_j) \left( \sum_{k=2}^K \frac{b_{k,j}^2 \sigma^2(x_{k,j}) + \sigma^2(u_j)}{\sigma^2(y_j)} \right) \quad (22)$$

where  $w_j = (q_j)^\alpha (p_j)^{1-\alpha}$  and  $q_j := p_j \mu(y_j) / \mu(y)$  is the income share of group  $j$ .

In the general case, allowing for the possibility that  $\text{corr}(X_{1,j}, X_{k,j}) \neq 0$  and that  $(X_{1,j}, U) \neq 0$ , decomposition by subgroups is now:


$$I_b(y) = \frac{1}{\alpha^2 - \alpha} \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{t_1} p_j \left[ \frac{b_{0,j} + \sum_{k=2}^K b_{k,j}\mu(x_{k,j})}{b_0 + \sum_{k=1}^K b_k\mu(x_k)} \right]^\alpha - 1 \right] \quad (23)$$

where  $b_{0,j}$  is now the OLS estimate of  $\beta_{0,j} + \beta_{1,j}\mu(x_{1,j}) = \beta_{0,j} + \beta_{1,j} \cdot j$  and

$$I_w(y) = \sum_{j=1}^{t_1} w_j I(y_j) \left[ \left( \sum_{k=2}^K b_{k,j}^2 \frac{\sigma^2(x_{k,j})}{\sigma^2(y_j)} + b_{k,j} \sum_{r \neq k} b_{r,j} \rho(x_{r,j}, x_k) \frac{\sigma(x_{r,j})\sigma(x_k)}{\sigma(y_j)} + b_{k,j} \rho(x_{k,j}, u_j) \frac{\sigma(x_{k,j})\sigma(u_j)}{\sigma(y_j)} + b_{k,j} \frac{\sigma(x_{k,j}, u_j)}{\sigma^2(y_j)} \right) + \frac{\sigma^2(u_j)}{\sigma^2(y_j)} \right], \quad (24)$$

Using a similar notation of that introduced in Section 4, we can write  $I(y_j) = \sum_{k=1}^{K+1} \Theta_{jk}$  and  $\theta_{jk} := \Theta_{jk} / I(y_j)$  rewrite the within-group inequality as

$$I_w(y) = \sum_{j=1}^{t_1} w_j \sum_{k=1}^{K+1} \Theta_{jk} = \sum_{j=1}^{t_1} w_j \sum_{k=1}^{K+1} I(y_j) \theta_{jk} \quad (25)$$



## 6. Empirical application

We applied the method outlined above to the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data set,<sup>3</sup> focusing on net disposable income for the United States and Finland in the mid 1980s and in 2004. We chose the United States and Finland as they are two relevant examples of countries belonging to the group of Anglo-Saxon and Nordic

*Table 1: Inequality statistics*

|         | Equivalised disposable income inequality |       |        |         |       |        |            |      |  |
|---------|--|-------|--------|---------|-------|--------|------------|------|--|
|         | United States                            |       |        | Finland |       |        | Finland/US |      |  |
|         | 1986                                     | 2004  | change | 1987    | 2004  | change | 1986-87    | 2004 |  |
| p90/p10 | 5.778                                    | 5.380 | -7%    | 2.375   | 2.775 | 17%    | -59%       | -48% |  |
| p90/p50 | 2.076                                    | 2.080 | 0%     | 1.482   | 1.636 | 10%    | -29%       | -21% |  |
| p50/p10 | 2.786                                    | 2.584 | -7%    | 1.603   | 1.698 | 6%     | -42%       | -34% |  |
| p75/p25 | 2.406                                    | 2.402 | 0%     | 1.557   | 1.687 | 8%     | -35%       | -30% |  |
| GE(0)   | 0.212                                    | 0.256 | 21%    | 0.066   | 0.101 | 54%    | -69%       | -60% |  |
| GE(1)   | 0.183                                    | 0.244 | 33%    | 0.063   | 0.124 | 96%    | -65%       | -49% |  |
| GE(2)   | 0.199                                    | 0.350 | 76%    | 0.070   | 0.315 | 347%   | -65%       | -10% |  |
| Gini    | 0.335                                    | 0.365 | 9%     | 0.193   | 0.240 | 24%    | -42%       | -34% |  |

*Note: p90 stands for the 90th percentile of the income distribution and similarly, p10, p50, p75 and p25.*

countries, of Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries, the first being characterised by higher inequality of after-tax income and a light welfare state, the second being characterised by relatively lower inequality and a substantial welfare state - see for example Brandolini and Smeeding (2008a, 2008b). We focus on inequality computed for equivalised income, using the square-root equivalence scale, so that each individual is given his family's income normalised by the square root of the family size.

We use these data also because they allow us to compare the distribution of a uniformly defined income variable at approximately the same periods. In fact, four data sets are considered: the United States in 1987 and 2004 and Finland in 1987 and 2004. As Table 1 shows equivalised income inequality in mid 1980s Finland was between 42% and 69% smaller than that in the US, according to inequality measures the GE and Gini indices, and between 29% and 59% smaller, using quantile ratios. Nearly twenty years later, inequality of equivalised income increased in both countries, especially for incomes in the upper tail of the income distribution, as GE(2) shows. Although equivalised-income inequality increased relatively more in Finland, it remained consistently lower in Finland with respect to the US.

<sup>3</sup> Data are available from <http://www.lisproject.org/>. For a description of the Luxembourg Income Study, see Gornick and Smeeding (2008). All empirical results can be replicated downloading relevant files from [http://fiorio.economia.unimi.it/ftp/proj/ineqdec/cowell\\_fiorio.zip](http://fiorio.economia.unimi.it/ftp/proj/ineqdec/cowell_fiorio.zip). The main results are obtained using a modification of the Stata routine `ineqrbd` (Fiorio and Jenkins 2007), which can also be downloaded from Stata typing "`ssc install ineqrbd, replace`" in the Stata command line.

We begin by examining the role of two important subgroups, those defined by sex and by education of the household head, where education is coded into four categories (less than high school, high school, college and Master/PhD). One way to investigate these issues is a decomposition by population subgroups of GE indices. Table 2 presents results by education and by sex subgroups: it first gives the measures of inequality computed in each subgroup and then shows the within- and between-subgroup decomposition of inequality for the three GE indices, for United States and then Finland in each period. Given the exact decomposability property of GE indices, the sum of the within and between components is equal to total inequality. One might conclude from Table 2 that, decomposing by education, both the inequality within educational subgroups and the inequality between groups increased in each country. In particular, between-group inequality nearly doubled in both countries, while the trend of within-group inequality was more pronounced in Finland. By contrast, a decomposition by sex of the household head shows roughly the opposite pattern of within and between components: while the former clearly increased in both countries the latter was roughly stable in absolute value in Finland and clearly decreasing in the United States.<sup>4</sup>

What emerges from this decomposition is that most of the inequality is due to the within component of inequality, but we do not know much about the role of other household characteristics. From this analysis one cannot disentangle the changed contribution of a demographic characteristic of the population (e.g. education) while controlling for the other (e.g. sex). A possible solution would be to create a finer partition of the sample by interacting education and sex, as proposed in Cowell and Jenkins (1995). However, this method could become cumbersome if one wanted to control for some additional characteristics (e.g. ethnicity, area of residence), would need a discretisation of variables which might reasonably be considered as continuous (e.g. age) and would reduce the sample size in each subgroup, hence the precision of the estimate.

What additional insights might a regression-based approach yield? By applying a regression-based factor-source decomposition as discussed in Section 5, we can assess the contribution of (the total value of) each right-hand-side variable to inequality. Our factor-source decomposition of within-group inequality allows us to assess whether one variable contributes uniformly to inequality in each subgroup or has a disproportionate effect across the subgroups. We estimate separate regressions for each subgroup as in (20) where  $\bar{y}_j$  is the vector of household equivalised incomes of households in group  $j$  and as covariates we used, for both countries in both periods, family variables (number of earners, number of children under age 18, whether the family rents or owns its own dwelling) and variables referring to the household head only (age, age squared, sex and four category dummies

<sup>4</sup> A careful analysis of these inequality statistics should also assess the magnitude of the sampling error (Cowell 1989), however in this paper we use the empirical application as an illustration of the methodologies presented in the previous sections. Further discussions about confidence intervals estimation of inequality measures and its decompositions will be presented in Section 7.

for education).<sup>5</sup> Clearly this is not a structural model and its specification is unsuitable for a causal interpretation.

*Table 2: Subgroup inequality decomposition by educational attainment and by sex of the householder.*

Subgroups by education United States

|                  | 1986  |       |       | 2004  |       |       |
|------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| education        | GE(0) | GE(1) | GE(2) | GE(0) | GE(1) | GE(2) |
| < high school    | 0.222 | 0.203 | 0.230 | 0.223 | 0.210 | 0.308 |
| high school      | 0.177 | 0.150 | 0.156 | 0.210 | 0.192 | 0.262 |
| college          | 0.135 | 0.127 | 0.144 | 0.185 | 0.182 | 0.248 |
| Master/PhD       | 0.144 | 0.122 | 0.124 | 0.217 | 0.222 | 0.306 |
| Within           | 0.179 | 0.150 | 0.165 | 0.206 | 0.195 | 0.298 |
| Between          | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.034 | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.052 |
| Finland          |       |       |       |       |       |       |
|                  | 1987  |       |       | 2004  |       |       |
| education        | GE(0) | GE(1) | GE(2) | GE(0) | GE(1) | GE(2) |
| < high school    | 0.062 | 0.059 | 0.061 | 0.092 | 0.099 | 0.131 |
| high school      | 0.058 | 0.055 | 0.061 | 0.075 | 0.082 | 0.193 |
| college          | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.063 | 0.102 | 0.144 | 0.424 |
| Master/PhD       | 0.045 | 0.046 | 0.048 | 0.085 | 0.094 | 0.121 |
| Within           | 0.059 | 0.056 | 0.062 | 0.088 | 0.110 | 0.300 |
| Between          | 0.007 | 0.007 | 0.008 | 0.013 | 0.014 | 0.014 |
| Subgroups by sex |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| United States    |       |       |       |       |       |       |
|                  | 1986  |       |       | 2004  |       |       |
| sex              | GE(0) | GE(1) | GE(2) | GE(0) | GE(1) | GE(2) |
| male             | 0.183 | 0.162 | 0.176 | 0.226 | 0.225 | 0.323 |
| female           | 0.270 | 0.246 | 0.290 | 0.283 | 0.263 | 0.377 |
| Within           | 0.197 | 0.170 | 0.187 | 0.252 | 0.241 | 0.346 |
| Between          | 0.015 | 0.013 | 0.012 | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| Finland          |       |       |       |       |       |       |
|                  | 1987  |       |       | 2004  |       |       |
| sex              | GE(0) | GE(1) | GE(2) | GE(0) | GE(1) | GE(2) |
| male             | 0.062 | 0.060 | 0.066 | 0.095 | 0.116 | 0.294 |
| female           | 0.078 | 0.079 | 0.093 | 0.112 | 0.141 | 0.369 |
| Within           | 0.063 | 0.061 | 0.068 | 0.100 | 0.122 | 0.313 |
| Between          | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.002 |

We deliberately adopted a parsimonious specification, but it is informative about the correlation of some key variables with equivalised household income.

Inequality decomposition estimates are presented for education subgroups in tables 3 and 4, and for gender subgroups in tables 5 and 6.<sup>6</sup> All these tables have the same structure: the first line reports the total inequality using GE(0), GE(1) and GE(2) for each of the two years considered and the second line reports the between inequality. In the following lines a decomposition of within-group inequality is provided, accounting for the contri-

<sup>5</sup> This is a clearly simplified model of equivalised income generation, however available data would not allow the development of a more complex structural model of household income. For further discussion of this issue, see Section 7.

<sup>6</sup> Tables of results are presented omitting the OLS coefficient estimates and their significance, which could however be obtained from the authors upon request.

bution of each covariate in each subgroup to within-group inequality. The contribution of each covariate in each subgroup is obtained as in (25), by multiplying the factor-source decomposition of inequality in each group ( $I(y_j)$ ) by its weight ( $w_j$ ). The factor-source decomposition of the inequality in each subgroup is reported in percentage terms in the last two columns for each of the years considered. As this inequality decomposition enjoys the same properties as the factor-source decomposition suggested in Shorrocks (1982), namely the fact that it is invariant to the inequality measure used, we used these factors to decompose the within components of the GE(0), GE(1) and GE(2).

Table 3 shows that in the US female headed households and households with young children accounted for a decreasing share of within-group inequality, while the number of earners in the household accounted for a relatively stable share of within-group inequality. This decomposition shows that the largest contribution to within-group inequality is due to the number of earners and the number of children younger than 18 and that the rented household accounts for a relatively large share of inequality in the high school and college educated household, while it is less important in the less and the most educated households. In Finland the number of young children is much less relevant to account for within-group inequality except for the group of college educated households, possibly due to a larger welfare system. The negligible contribution to within-group inequality of the most educated group reflects the relatively small share of population in this groups (less than 1.3% in 2004) and shows that within-group inequality is mostly due to the group of high school or less educated households (Table 4).

Looking at gender subgroups, Table 5 shows that the large increase of within-group inequality in the US as measured by the GE(2) index between the two years considered is accounted for by the female subgroup and in particular by the number of earners, the number of young children and by high level of education. This trend is instead much less evident in Finland (Table 6).

Finally, it should be pointed out that the proposed inequality decomposition is exact only if the contribution of the residual is not ignored. Indeed, tables 3 - 6 show that, after controlling for a set of individual and family characteristics, the residual within each subgroup still accounts for a proportion between 61% and 94% of total inequality within subgroups and that the residual accounts for an increasing share of within-group inequality over time. This suggests that a simple linear model such as the one we have suggested for illustrative purposes should be enriched either by including more controls, when available, or by specifying a richer model.





## 7. Discussion

Clearly any empirical methodology should come with a set of warnings about implementation: so too with the techniques illustrated in Section 6.

First, although the computation of standard errors is sometimes treated as a trivial problem (as in Morduch and Sicular 2002), this is not so; the main reason for the complexity is that the inequality index computed from a random sample is itself a random variable and cannot be treated as deterministic in the calculation of standard errors (see Section 4); moreover,  $I(y)$  often appears at the denominator of these decompositions making theoretical computation of standard errors cumbersome. A viable way to assess the robustness of estimates is to provide different specifications of the regression models, assessing the effects of the inclusion or exclusions of some independent variables and the significance of results could be assessed by computing standard errors using the bootstrap.

Second, a single-equation model, such as that developed above, should only be interpreted as a descriptive model, showing correlations rather than causal relationships. Could we have done better by opting for a richer model such as the Bourguignon et al. (2001, 2008) simultaneous-equation extension of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition? Their interest is in the change across time of the full distribution of income and related statistics. The components of their model are an earnings equation for each household member (linking individual characteristics to their remuneration), a labour supply equation (modelling the decision of the individual and of other household's members) and a household income equation (aggregating the individuals' contributions to household income formation). The estimation of such an econometric model at two different dates allows one to disentangle: (i) a "price effect" (people with given characteristics and the same occupation get a different income because the remuneration structure has changed) (ii) a "participation" or "occupation effect" (individuals with given characteristics do not make the same choices as for entering the labour force because their household may have changed) and (iii) a "population effect" (individual and household incomes change because socio-demographic characteristics of population of households and individuals change). The main merit of such an approach is that it builds a comprehensive model of how decisions regarding income formation are taken, including the individual decision of entering the labour force and wage formation mechanism, into a household-based decision process, extracting part of the information left in the residuals of single-equation linear models as the one used in this paper. Bourguignon et al. (2001) used this methodology to argue persuasively that the apparent stability of Taiwan's income inequality was just due to the offsetting of different forces. However, the rich structural model

Table 3: Factor source decomposition of the within-group component of inequality of equivalised income in the United States using a decomposition by educational attainment.

|                    | GE(0)  |        | GE(1)                 |        | GE(2)  |        | Factor source decomposition of within inequality (in %) |        |
|--------------------|--------|--------|-----------------------|--------|--------|--------|---|--------|
|                    | 1986   | 2004   | 1986                  | 2004   | 1986   | 2004   | 1986  | 2004   |
| Total inequality   | 0.212  | 0.256  | 0.183                 | 0.244  | 0.199  | 0.350  |   |        |
| Between inequality | 0.033  | 0.050  | 0.033                 | 0.050  | 0.034  | 0.052  |   |        |
|                    |        |        | Less than high school |        |        |        |   |        |
| number of earners  | 0.008  | 0.007  | 0.005                 | 0.004  | 0.004  | 0.003  | 14.189  | 17.912 |
| num. children < 18 | 0.006  | 0.001  | 0.004                 | 0.001  | 0.003  | 0.001  | 11.053  | 3.709  |
| housing rented     | 0.002  | 0.001  | 0.001                 | 0.001  | 0.001  | 0.000  | 4.277   | 2.712  |
| age                | 0.004  | 0.001  | 0.003                 | 0.000  | 0.002  | 0.000  | 7.364   | 1.443  |
| age squared        | -0.002 | 0.000  | -0.002                | 0.000  | -0.001 | 0.000  | -4.461  | -0.791 |
| female             | 0.002  | 0.000  | 0.001                 | 0.000  | 0.001  | 0.000  | 3.319   | 0.526  |
| residual           | 0.035  | 0.028  | 0.022                 | 0.015  | 0.017  | 0.012  | 64.259  | 74.490 |
|                    |        |        | High school           |        |        |        |   |        |
| number of earners  | 0.008  | 0.008  | 0.007                 | 0.007  | 0.007  | 0.008  | 8.844   | 8.294  |
| num. children < 18 | 0.013  | 0.004  | 0.010                 | 0.003  | 0.010  | 0.004  | 13.804  | 3.752  |
| housing rented     | 0.004  | 0.004  | 0.003                 | 0.003  | 0.003  | 0.004  | 4.127   | 3.915  |
| age                | 0.011  | 0.006  | 0.009                 | 0.005  | 0.009  | 0.006  | 12.356  | 6.051  |
| age squared        | -0.008 | -0.004 | -0.006                | -0.003 | -0.006 | -0.004 | -8.718  | -4.191 |
| female             | 0.003  | 0.000  | 0.003                 | 0.000  | 0.003  | 0.000  | 3.611   | 0.299  |
| residual           | 0.060  | 0.082  | 0.049                 | 0.066  | 0.049  | 0.079  | 65.977  | 81.878 |
|                    |        |        | College               |        |        |        |   |        |
| number of earners  | 0.000  | 0.001  | 0.000                 | 0.001  | 0.000  | 0.002  | 1.201   | 2.132  |
| num. children < 18 | 0.003  | 0.001  | 0.003                 | 0.002  | 0.005  | 0.003  | 14.748  | 2.914  |
| housing rented     | 0.000  | 0.001  | 0.000                 | 0.002  | 0.001  | 0.003  | 1.530   | 2.550  |
| age                | 0.003  | 0.003  | 0.004                 | 0.003  | 0.005  | 0.006  | 15.369  | 5.668  |
| age squared        | -0.002 | -0.002 | -0.003                | -0.003 | -0.004 | -0.004 | -13.267   | -4.299 |
| female             | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000                 | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000  | 1.339   | 0.207  |
| residual           | 0.015  | 0.044  | 0.018                 | 0.054  | 0.027  | 0.091  | 79.080  | 90.828 |
|                    |        |        | Master/PhD            |        |        |        |   |        |
| number of earners  | 0.001  | 0.000  | 0.001                 | 0.000  | 0.001  | 0.001  | 3.539   | 0.770  |
| num. children < 18 | 0.002  | 0.000  | 0.003                 | 0.001  | 0.005  | 0.001  | 14.908  | 1.595  |
| housing rented     | 0.001  | 0.000  | 0.001                 | 0.001  | 0.001  | 0.001  | 3.717   | 1.498  |
| age                | 0.002  | 0.001  | 0.003                 | 0.001  | 0.005  | 0.003  | 15.852  | 3.315  |
| age squared        | -0.002 | 0.000  | -0.002                | -0.001 | -0.004 | -0.001 | -12.578   | -1.727 |
| female             | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000                 | 0.000  | 0.001  | 0.000  | 2.212   | 0.269  |
| residual           | 0.011  | 0.019  | 0.014                 | 0.033  | 0.022  | 0.080  | 72.350  | 94.280 |

Table 4: Factor source decomposition of the within-group component of inequality of equivalised income in Finland using a decomposition by educational attainment.

|                    | GE(0)  |        | GE(1)                 |        | GE(2)  |        | Factor source decomposition of within inequality (in %) |         |
|--------------------|--------|--------|-----------------------|--------|--------|--------|---|---------|
|                    | 1986   | 2004   | 1986                  | 2004   | 1986   | 2004   | 1986  | 2004    |
| Total inequality   | 0.066  | 0.101  | 0.063                 | 0.124  | 0.070  | 0.315  |   |         |
| Between inequality | 0.007  | 0.013  | 0.007                 | 0.014  | 0.008  | 0.014  |   |         |
|                    |        |        | Less than high school |        |        |        |   |         |
| number of earners  | 0.005  | 0.003  | 0.004                 | 0.002  | 0.004  | 0.003  | 17.992  | 13.753  |
| num. children < 18 | 0.001  | 0.000  | 0.001                 | 0.000  | 0.001  | 0.000  | 4.354   | 1.538   |
| housing rented     | 0.000  | 0.001  | 0.000                 | 0.001  | 0.000  | 0.001  | 0.713   | 3.194   |
| age                | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.001                | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.001 | -4.236  | -4.186  |
| age squared        | 0.002  | 0.002  | 0.002                 | 0.001  | 0.002  | 0.002  | 7.354   | 7.737   |
| female             | 0.001  | 0.000  | 0.001                 | 0.000  | 0.001  | 0.000  | 2.420   | 1.595   |
| residual           | 0.020  | 0.015  | 0.017                 | 0.013  | 0.016  | 0.015  | 71.403  | 76.369  |
|                    |        |        | High school           |        |        |        |   |         |
| number of earners  | 0.002  | 0.001  | 0.002                 | 0.001  | 0.002  | 0.003  | 8.557   | 4.382   |
| num. children < 18 | 0.001  | 0.001  | 0.001                 | 0.001  | 0.002  | 0.001  | 5.873   | 1.979   |
| housing rented     | 0.001  | 0.001  | 0.001                 | 0.001  | 0.001  | 0.001  | 3.008   | 1.907   |
| age                | 0.003  | 0.002  | 0.003                 | 0.002  | 0.003  | 0.003  | 10.671  | 4.725   |
| age squared        | -0.002 | -0.001 | -0.002                | -0.001 | -0.002 | -0.002 | -7.746  | -3.403  |
| female             | 0.001  | 0.000  | 0.001                 | 0.000  | 0.001  | 0.001  | 2.267   | 1.206   |
| residual           | 0.019  | 0.029  | 0.018                 | 0.029  | 0.020  | 0.061  | 77.369  | 89.205  |
|                    |        |        | College               |        |        |        |   |         |
| number of earners  | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000                 | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.002  | 0.957   | 0.844   |
| num. children < 18 | 0.000  | 0.001  | 0.000                 | 0.001  | 0.001  | 0.005  | 5.871   | 2.364   |
| housing rented     | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000                 | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.001  | 2.132   | 0.393   |
| age                | 0.001  | 0.000  | 0.001                 | 0.001  | 0.002  | 0.002  | 14.348  | 0.889   |
| age squared        | -0.001 | 0.000  | -0.001                | 0.000  | -0.001 | -0.001 | -10.601   | -0.667  |
| female             | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000                 | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.001  | 1.511   | 0.286   |
| residual           | 0.005  | 0.033  | 0.007                 | 0.056  | 0.011  | 0.200  | 85.783  | 95.892  |
|                    |        |        | Master/PhD            |        |        |        |   |         |
| number of earners  | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000                 | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000  | 4.909   | 0.919   |
| num. children < 18 | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000                 | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000  | 17.572  | 5.114   |
| housing rented     | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000                 | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.446   | 1.534   |
| age                | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000                 | 0.000  | 0.000  | -0.001 | 8.858   | -12.044 |
| age squared        | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000                 | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.001  | -1.908  | 19.319  |
| female             | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000                 | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.251   | 0.254   |
| residual           | 0.000  | 0.001  | 0.000                 | 0.002  | 0.001  | 0.004  | 69.873  | 84.904  |

Table 5: Factor source decomposition of the within-group component of inequality of equivalised income in the United States using a decomposition by gender


|                    | GE(0)  |        | GE(1)  |        | GE(2)  |        | Factor source decomposition of within inequality (in %) |        |
|--------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---|--------|
|                    | 1986   | 2004   | 1986   | 2004   | 1986   | 2004   | 1986  | 2004   |
| Total inequality   | 0.212  | 0.256  | 0.183  | 0.244  | 0.199  | 0.350  |   |        |
| Between inequality | 0.015  | 0.004  | 0.013  | 0.003  | 0.012  | 0.003  |   |        |
|                    |        |        | Male   |        |        |        |   |        |
| num. of earners    | 0.009  | 0.004  | 0.009  | 0.004  | 0.010  | 0.006  | 5.834   | 3.136  |
| num. < 18          | 0.019  | 0.003  | 0.018  | 0.004  | 0.021  | 0.006  | 12.273  | 2.739  |
| housing rented     | 0.005  | 0.003  | 0.004  | 0.003  | 0.005  | 0.005  | 2.971   | 2.248  |
| age                | 0.014  | 0.005  | 0.013  | 0.005  | 0.015  | 0.008  | 8.937   | 4.160  |
| age squared        | -0.010 | -0.003 | -0.009 | -0.004 | -0.011 | -0.006 | -6.231  | -2.810 |
| high school        | -0.002 | -0.002 | -0.002 | -0.002 | -0.002 | -0.004 | -1.426  | -1.883 |
| college            | 0.007  | 0.005  | 0.006  | 0.005  | 0.007  | 0.008  | 4.372   | 3.960  |
| master/PhD         | 0.016  | 0.013  | 0.015  | 0.014  | 0.017  | 0.021  | 10.263  | 10.659 |
| residual           | 0.098  | 0.095  | 0.092  | 0.101  | 0.107  | 0.157  | 63.008  | 77.791 |
|                    |        |        | Female |        |        |        |   |        |
| num. of earners    | 0.005  | 0.008  | 0.003  | 0.007  | 0.002  | 0.009  | 11.725  | 6.019  |
| num. < 18          | 0.004  | 0.003  | 0.002  | 0.003  | 0.002  | 0.004  | 10.337  | 2.671  |
| housing rented     | 0.001  | 0.006  | 0.001  | 0.005  | 0.001  | 0.006  | 3.405   | 4.313  |
| age                | 0.001  | 0.005  | 0.001  | 0.004  | 0.000  | 0.006  | 2.800   | 3.814  |
| age squared        | 0.000  | -0.003 | 0.000  | -0.002 | 0.000  | -0.003 | -0.762  | -2.250 |
| high school        | 0.000  | -0.002 | 0.000  | -0.001 | 0.000  | -0.002 | 0.610   | -1.288 |
| college            | 0.002  | 0.007  | 0.001  | 0.006  | 0.001  | 0.007  | 5.951   | 5.104  |
| master/PhD         | 0.002  | 0.009  | 0.001  | 0.008  | 0.001  | 0.010  | 4.797   | 7.045  |
| residual           | 0.025  | 0.097  | 0.015  | 0.083  | 0.011  | 0.108  | 61.138  | 74.572 |


Table 6: Factor source decomposition of the within-group component of inequality of equivalised income in Finland using a decomposition by gender

|                    | GE(0)  |        | GE(1)  |        | GE(2)  |        | Factor source decomposition of within inequality (in %) |        |
|--------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---|--------|
|                    | 1986   | 2004   | 1986   | 2004   | 1986   | 2004   | 1986  | 2004   |
| Total inequality   | 0.066  | 0.101  | 0.063  | 0.124  | 0.070  | 0.315  |   |        |
| Between inequality | 0.003  | 0.002  | 0.003  | 0.002  | 0.002  | 0.002  |   |        |
|                    |        |        |        | Male   |        |        |   |        |
| num. of earners    | 0.003  | 0.002  | 0.004  | 0.002  | 0.004  | 0.005  | 8.005   | 2.372  |
| num. < 18          | 0.002  | 0.001  | 0.003  | 0.002  | 0.003  | 0.005  | 5.050   | 2.108  |
| housing rented     | 0.001  | 0.001  | 0.001  | 0.001  | 0.001  | 0.003  | 1.368   | 1.195  |
| age                | 0.001  | 0.002  | 0.002  | 0.002  | 0.002  | 0.006  | 2.996   | 2.466  |
| age squared        | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.003 | -1.183  | -1.439 |
| high school        | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000  | -0.001 | -0.461  | -0.283 |
| college            | 0.005  | 0.002  | 0.006  | 0.003  | 0.005  | 0.007  | 10.458  | 3.141  |
| master/PhD         | 0.001  | 0.001  | 0.001  | 0.001  | 0.001  | 0.002  | 1.418   | 0.875  |
| residual           | 0.032  | 0.060  | 0.040  | 0.076  | 0.037  | 0.201  | 72.349  | 89.566 |
|                    |        |        |        | Female |        |        |   |        |
| num. of earners    | 0.003  | 0.001  | 0.001  | 0.001  | 0.003  | 0.003  | 14.199  | 3.358  |
| num. < 18          | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.001  | -0.111  | 0.729  |
| housing rented     | 0.001  | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.001  | 0.001  | 2.602   | 0.622  |
| age                | -0.002 | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000  | -0.002 | 0.000  | -7.151  | -0.345 |
| age squared        | 0.003  | 0.000  | 0.001  | 0.000  | 0.003  | 0.001  | 13.315  | 0.845  |
| high school        | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000  | -0.043  | -0.011 |
| college            | 0.002  | 0.001  | 0.001  | 0.001  | 0.002  | 0.003  | 9.694   | 3.809  |
| master/PhD         | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.001  | 0.253   | 1.247  |
| residual           | 0.015  | 0.029  | 0.004  | 0.033  | 0.015  | 0.079  | 67.243  | 89.745 |

comes at the expense of increasing the complication of the estimation process and of introducing additional and perhaps questionable assumptions. Among the most important limitations of the Bourguignon et al. approach are: the robustness of the estimates of some coefficients, the problem of simultaneity between household members' labour-supply decisions, the issue of understanding what is left in the residuals of the labour supply equations and the counterfactual wage equations, the path-dependence problem (i.e. which counterfactual is computed first) is also a problem.<sup>7</sup> In sum, the full structural model approach for inequality analysis can be cumbersome and is likely to be sensitive to model specification.

<sup>7</sup> To get some idea of the magnitude of the path-dependence problem the authors computed all possible evaluations of price, participation and population effects, although the complex problem of computing proper confidence intervals for the structural model is not tackled. The problem has something in common with that of the Shapley-value method discussed in section 2.1.






## 8. Conclusion

At the beginning we raised the question of whether the main approaches to inequality decomposition were on speaking terms. The *a priori* approach and the regression-model approach outlined in section 2 might appear at first glance to be incompatible. However, they can be made to “talk to each other”. The key to the translation lies in an appropriate application and interpretation of the factor-source decomposition method. Our approach to reconciling the different strands of inequality-decomposition analysis is based on a single-equation regression, builds on the Shorrocks (1982) methodology and is aimed at providing a tool for understanding inequality, especially when the data are not sufficiently detailed to allow a structural model specification. It shares some features with the approach suggested by Fields (2003),<sup>8</sup> but improves on it by including in the analysis the decomposition by subgroups and in showing how this might also be useful to identify differences in determinants of inequality.


Our approach is fairly robust, providing an improvement on other methods; it also provides results consistent with other decomposition methods. The simple specification makes no claims about causality but enables one to distinguish clearly between methods of accounting for inequality that rely solely on a breakdown of the factors that underlie predicted income and the breakdown of inequality of observed income.

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8 See also Fields and Yoo (2000), Morduch and Sicular (2002).








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
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


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# Information on the GINI project

## Aims

The core objective of GINI is to deliver important new answers to questions of great interest to European societies: What are the social, cultural and political impacts that increasing inequalities in income, wealth and education may have? For the answers, GINI combines an interdisciplinary analysis that draws on economics, sociology, political science and health studies, with improved methodologies, uniform measurement, wide country coverage, a clear policy dimension and broad dissemination.

Methodologically, GINI aims to:

- exploit differences between and within 29 countries in inequality levels and trends for understanding the impacts and teasing out implications for policy and institutions,
- elaborate on the effects of both individual distributional positions and aggregate inequalities, and
- allow for feedback from impacts to inequality in a two-way causality approach.

The project operates in a framework of policy-oriented debate and international comparisons across all EU countries (except Cyprus and Malta), the USA, Japan, Canada and Australia.

## Inequality Impacts and Analysis

Social impacts of inequality include educational access and achievement, individual employment opportunities and labour market behaviour, household joblessness, living standards and deprivation, family and household formation/breakdown, housing and intergenerational social mobility, individual health and life expectancy, and social cohesion versus polarisation. Underlying long-term trends, the economic cycle and the current financial and economic crisis will be incorporated. Politico-cultural impacts investigated are: Do increasing income/educational inequalities widen cultural and political 'distances', alienating people from politics, globalisation and European integration? Do they affect individuals' participation and general social trust? Is acceptance of inequality and policies of redistribution affected by inequality itself? What effects do political systems (coalitions/winner-takes-all) have? Finally, it focuses on costs and benefits of policies limiting income inequality and its efficiency for mitigating other inequalities (health, housing, education and opportunity), and addresses the question what contributions policy making itself may have made to the growth of inequalities.

## Support and Activities

The project receives EU research support to the amount of Euro 2.7 million. The work will result in four main reports and a final report, some 70 discussion papers and 29 country reports. The start of the project is 1 February 2010 for a three-year period. Detailed information can be found on the website.

[www.gini-research.org](http://www.gini-research.org)





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