



GINI

INEQUALITY AND ANTI-GLOBALIZATION BACKLASH BY POLITICAL PARTIES

Brian Burgoon

GINI DISCUSSION PAPER 14
OCTOBER 2011

GROWING INEQUALITIES' IMPACTS

Acknowledgement

Paper prepared for *GINI: Growing Inequalities' Impacts*, financed by the European Union Framework 7 Program.

WP5 Workshop in Amsterdam, 18-19 September, 2011

October 2011

© Brian Burgoon, Amsterdam

General contact: gini@uva.nl

Correspondence to: Brian Burgoon, University of Amsterdam (AISSR), O.Z.Achterburgwal 237,
1012 DL Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Telephone: +31 20 525 3189, Email: b.m.burgoon@uva.nl

Bibliographic Information

Burgoon, B. (2011). *Inequality and Anti-globalization Backlash by Political Parties*. Amsterdam, AIAS, GINI Discussion Paper 14.

Information may be quoted provided the source is stated accurately and clearly.

Reproduction for own/internal use is permitted.

This paper can be downloaded from our website www.gini-research.org.



Inequality and Anti-Globalization Backlash by Political Parties

Brian Burgoon

University of Amsterdam (AISSR)

17 October 2011
DP 14







Table of contents

ABSTRACT	7
1. PARTIES AND PRO- AND ANTI-GLOBALIZATION POSITION-TAKING	13
1.1.How inequality might spur anti-globalization backlash	14
Hypothesis 1:.....	16
1.2.How partisanship and redistribution might mediate the effects of inequality	16
Hypothesis 2a:.....	16
Hypothesis 2b:.....	17
Hypothesis 3a:.....	17
Hypothesis 3b:.....	18
2. ANTI-GLOBALIZATION POSITION-TAKING AND INCOME INEQUALITY IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES.....	19
2.1.Dependent variables: Anti-globalization in Party Platforms.....	19
2.2.Independent variables: Inequality and controls.....	21
2.3.Estimation approach	24
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: DOES INEQUALITY INFLUENCE ANTI-GLOBALIZATION POSITION-TAKING?.....	25
4. CONCLUSION	33
REFERENCES.....	35
GINI DISCUSSION PAPERS	41
INFORMATION ON THE GINI PROJECT.....	43





Abstract

Does inequality fuel anti-globalization backlash? This paper answers this question by analyzing how income inequality affects the embrace or eschew of globalization by political parties. It focuses on party opposition to and support for trade openness, European-Union integration, and general internationalism in all party platforms of 22 advanced-industrial democracies between 1960 and 2008. The analysis considers how and under what conditions inequality affects such position-taking. The main finding is that inequality tends to increase parties' anti-globalization backlash, an effect that does not significantly differ across party families or globalization exposure but does get diminished with more generous redistributive policies. These findings clarify the nature and origins of anti-EU and other aspects of anti-globalization backlash, and suggest how socio-economic conditions may be central to such backlash.

Word count (text, footnotes, references): 8713





A fundamental feature of political life involves how much national polities are open to global political and economic interaction. This is fundamental not least because it is a political choice with deep implications for wealth, peace and justice in the world. It is also a political choice never to be taken for granted, as is already evidenced by the rise of anti-globalization, isolationist sentiments in the party politics of Europe and elsewhere. Recent increases in anti-immigration, anti-EU, protectionist, and general anti-internationalist position-taking by parties make it clear that the party-political basis for post-War pan-European and international economic and political engagement may be under threat. To understand this threat, one needs to understand when, where and why political parties might support and oppose globalization.

An often-discussed factor in such anti-globalization politics involves income inequality. Income inequality has risen in most advanced industrial democracies in recent decades, broadly parallel to and possibly reflecting increases in European and international economic and political engagement (e.g. Wood 1990; Beckfield 2006). Whatever its origins, such inequality has extensive and far-reaching implications for polities – including subjective insecurity, more criminality, longer and more irregular working hours, shortened life-spans, declining social and political trust, and subjective unhappiness (Wilkinson 2004; Wilkinson and Pickett 2006; Chamlin and Cochran 2006; Daly et.al.2001; Bell and Freeman 2001; Uslaner 2002; Rothstein et.al. 2005; Anderson and Singer 2008). As voters and their political representatives react to income inequality, they might well be expected to turn inward, retreating to familiar traditions on national shores rather than embracing global economic and political institutions and openness.


Whether this is so, however, remains unknown in existing studies of inequality and political economy. In the extensive attention to income inequalities, there has been little to consider their implications for anti-globalization backlash, and in the equally extensive literature on the politics of European and global integration there is little to explore whether support or opposition to such integration involves income distributions. The exceptions of note involve debate over inequality's implications for ethnic and anti-immigrant attitudes (Bilal et.al. 2003; Gerritsen and Lubbers 2010; Green et.al.1998b). But there is virtual silence about inequality's implications for other faces and manifestations of anti-globalization backlash, such as Euroskepticism among political parties. Such a silence may be surprising, but it is symptomatic of the relative paucity of studies applying sociological insights to study of political and economic integration (Favell and Guiraudon 2009).

This paper explores the role of inequality in shaping partisan support for and opposition to political and economic globalization. It does so theoretically by articulating the plausible implications of inequality for the positioning of parties towards various aspects of anti-globalization backlash. Exogenous sources of insecurities that

themselves increase anti-globalization backlash, such as already-existing economic openness, might have stronger positive effects on anti-globalization sentiment under conditions of higher inequality. But the paper develops the expectation that inequalities ought also to have direct effects for anti-globalization backlash. Whatever its origins, income inequality can undermine economic securities and generate economic and political uncertainties that likely alter the position-taking of parties on globalization: leading them to consider options to redress these problems, among those options nationalist retreat. And inequalities may also give party entrepreneurs incentives and political opportunities to use anti-globalization sentiments as a form of blame avoidance and scape-goating. Such party responses to inequalities manifest themselves as nationalist backlash against global economic and political openness. Such party responses to inequalities, however, might be expected to differ across different party families and socio-economic policies. And they might particularly differ in the face of redistributive social policies: the reduction of inequalities through redistributive taxation and social policies might, net of their origins, diminish such insecurities in ways that plausibly reduce anti-globalization backlash.

The empirical focus of the study, developed in section two below, is on how income inequality affects party positioning with respect to anti-globalization backlash, using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project on party platforms in 22 OECD countries between 1960 and 2008. I focus on several measures of net anti-globalization position-taking, based on how much a party's platform expresses support for or opposition to trade protectionism, general international engagement, and European-Union integration. This gauges simple anti- or pro-globalization of parties in a given country and election-year. It provides more nuanced understanding of pro- and anti-globalization sentiment among parties than alternative measures, such as the existence or electoral success of fringe parties. And the measures provide leverage to consider variation in such sentiment over time and space, more than measures based on surveys or expert judgments. The explanatory analyses of these data, developed in sections two and three, focuses on how comparable measures of income inequality influence pro- and anti-globalization position-taking.

The principal conclusion of the empirical analysis is that income inequality tends to increase all measures of anti-globalization backlash in party platforms. Particularly with respect to net, or post tax and transfer, income inequality, political parties in settings with higher inequality tend to take more protectionist, anti-internationalist, anti-EU stances. These effects are generally not, it appears, significantly different across different party families or electoral fortunes of parties, nor across different settings with respect to *ex ante* trade openness, unemployment, growth, or political institutions. On the other hand, government redistributive policies via taxation and social policies *do* tend to diminish any anti-globalization backlash arising from (pre-tax, pre-transfer) inequality. These



results suggest that income inequality, already found to generate a range of domestic problems, is also an important and to some extent preventable contributor to nationalist, anti-globalization backlash.





1. Parties and Pro- and Anti-Globalization Position-taking

How economic inequality influences the positions that political parties take on issues of economic and political openness is not obvious, *a priori*. One can expect domestic inequality to play an indirect role in shaping attitudes and partisan position-taking on globalization – by mediating the influence of background economic and political risk factors that themselves directly influence anti-globalization backlash. For instance, *ex ante* flows of trade, capital or migration might well generate economic and political risks in a polity that can be expected to spur anti-globalization movements throughout a party system (Burgoon 2009a). The degree to which such openness spurs anti-globalization backlash, however, might be mediated by the income inequality prevailing in a polity. Where openness unfolds in settings with high inequality, the latter might reveal or signal that globalization is not panning-out well for the polity. And such can fuel sentiment and political mobilization against future openness – anti-globalization backlash, hence.

Whether inequality has *direct* effects for anti-globalization position-taking is more uncertain. Inequality, unmoored from its own origins, might have no clear consequences for anti-globalization sentiments in a polity, and hence among parties. Indeed, some studies of anti-minority, anti-immigrant attitudes and actions reason that general economic deprivation can have many offsetting implications for such xenophobia such that general deprivation has no significant end effect on such anti-globalization feeling (Green et.al. 1998a, 1998b). On the other hand, higher domestic inequality might plausibly increase support for international engagement and political institutions in order to compensate for the palpable economic failings of domestic governance and economic life. Such logic fits the finding that publics support European-Union integration where home institutions are palpably wanting (Sanchez-Cuenca 2000). If so, one might hypothesize that inequality *reduces* anti-globalization sentiments and partisan position-taking.


My own expectation, however, is that domestic inequality may well play out among citizens and their party representatives in ways that directly *increase* anti-globalization positioning by political parties. Further, I expect that these direct effects might well be mediated by the partisan orientation of parties and by the social-policy setting within which parties respond to inequalities. I lay out each of these expectations in turn.

1.1. How inequality might spur anti-globalization backlash

Ex ante income inequalities can have strong *direct* effects on anti-globalization backlash via their effects on the preferences of voters and their party representatives. Net of its complicated origins, domestic income inequality has been shown in a range of studies to alter the economic preferences and sentiments of citizens, including higher preferred and actual working time, more subjective income insecurity and heightened stress (Bell and Freeman 2001; Alesina et.al.2004). Such economic insecurities, in turn, can be expected to generate suspicion towards exposure to further global economic and political forces to the extent that past globalization has caused, or has been portrayed in the media and popular discussion to cause, income inequality. Such has long stated in much popular and scholarly political economy and media reporting, and may be politically salient regardless of the globalization in place in a given country-year (e.g. Beckfield 2005; Wood 1995; Kapstein 1996; Helpman et.al. 2008). If so, anti-globalization backlash might then be one of many possible ways of according blame to negative economic developments like inequality – where outside engagement and influences are the scapegoats for domestic inequality, along-side any other possible (domestic) scapegoats (Douglas 2005). Hence, at least part of the political reactions to domestic inequality can be anti-globalization backlash.

More importantly, several characteristics of human cognition, well-studied by social psychologists, might lead citizens to respond to domestic inequality by focusing disproportionately on external, foreign scapegoats – and, hence, on anti-globalization. An old body of theorizing known as ‘frustration aggression displacement theory’ suggests that economic hardships can spark a displacement of aggression, where the scape-goating turns to outsiders and external forces to one’s own decision-making and volition (Dollard et.al.1939). More recent ‘social identity theory’ suggests that people dealing with hardships tend to blame out-groups to preserve their social identity (Tajfel 1981). And work within ‘relative deprivation theory’ suggests how economic conditions and feelings of deprivation relative to other groups, particularly out-groups, can involve non-rational scape-goating of the latter to emotionally cope with economic hardships (Brown 1988; Runciman 1966; Tchitereke 2001; and De la Rey 1991).

Related to these views is “attribution theory,” an approach that suggest the strongest direct link of inequality to anti-globalization sentiment. Attribution theory focuses on how individuals make sense of and explain their individual position by attributing that position to factors that are (among other things) either internal or external to an individual’s own volition and control (Kelley 1967; Weiner 1992). Attribution is often self-serving, where negative developments are attributed to external factors while positive developments to internal factors of the individual’s own doing (Hewstone 1983). And this line of argument extends to the way negative developments are often attributed to out-groups and positive developments to in-groups, such that scape-goating tends to implicate



out-groups more readily than in-groups (Taylor and Jaggi, 1974; Poppe 2001). By this logic, individuals or parties judging economic inequality to be a negative development are likely to attribute this to out-groups and foreign influence, a process that can be expected to spur scepticism towards economic or political global contacts.

Empirically, social-psychological research has found signs of links between inequalities and other economic hardships to a range of acts and/or sentiments that are part of, or isomorphic to, anti-globalization backlash. Analysis of a range of national settings, using diverse methods, has found economic hardship generally and income inequality in particular to be sources of racist and ethno-centrist beliefs and violence (Glick 2005; Duckitt 1994); of anti-immigrant attitudes and violence (Poppe 2001; Morris 1998; Tshitereke 1999; Burns 2008; Crush and Pendleton 2007; Bilal et.al 2003; O'Connell 2005); of distrust of other national populations (Gerritsen and Lubbers 2010); and of scepticism towards various aspects of European integration (Hobolt and Lablond 2009; Burgoon 2009b; Cosmina and Colonescu 2008). Some of these findings are not without dispute, as some find only weak correlation between economic hardships and xenophobia (Green et.al. 1998a, 1998b; Krueger and Pischke 1997).

Accepting that there is debate about these empirical referents and the theoretical logic underlying it, attribution theory supports the expectation that voters within the polity will tend react to income inequality, whatever its origins and hence non-rationally, with sentiments that are more anti-foreigner, anti-global engagement than would otherwise obtain. If so, these reactions of citizens may be taken-up by representatives of political parties seeking votes of such citizens, a process that might well differ by party and circumstance, an issue to which I will turn momentarily. But if the median voter is likely to respond to economic inequalities and insecurities in ways that involve anti-globalization sentiment, then most political party platforms will tend also to express more anti-globalization sentiment.

Representatives of political parties may also respond to less directed voter discontent surrounding economic inequality by looking for ways to avoid political blame – such blame-avoidance being a hallmark of legislative volution (Mayhew 1974; Weaver 1986). This could involve party-political scape-goating autonomous from the social psychology of individuals experiencing economic hardship. The problems and divisions that inequality signals to political entrepreneurs should spark partisan search for politically-winning answers, and their search and choices can include anti-globalization that shapes or cues political mobilization to secure votes and win elections (c.f. Netjes and Edwards 2006; Steenbergen et.al.2007). By this logic, partisan anti-globalization positioning reflects not so much an aggregation of voter discontent as exploitation of it (Betz 1994; Jackman and Volpert 1996). Such more cynical, strategic-positioning among party representatives underlie the same broad expectation emerging

from social psychology of citizens in high-inequality settings: *ex ante* income inequality can be expected to spur partisan anti-globalization position-taking. Both logics underlie the first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1:

Higher income inequality should, all other things equal, yield higher economic insecurities, uncertainty and hardship that spark scape-goating of out-groups that includes anti-globalization position-taking among political parties.

1.2. How partisanship and redistribution might mediate the effects of inequality

Although inequality might increase anti-globalization position taking in general, as reasoned above, the degree to which it does so may be mediated by third political and policy conditions. Most obviously, differences in the ideologies and constituencies of political parties suggest that Left-Right partisanship will shape how parties respond to inequalities. Such partisanship involves starkly contrasting ideologies with respect to the role of government and with respect to markets, but also with respect to moral or cultural traditionalism and diversity (c.f. Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990; Kriesi et.al. 2006; and Van der Brug and van Spanje 2009). In light of the former Left-Right cleavage, Left-oriented parties beholden to the likely losers of rising inequality and champions of government interventions to redress inequality will be quicker to frame higher income inequality as a salient political problem than do non-Left parties. Combined with the logic underlying Hypothesis One, one might then expect Left-parties to more sharply respond to inequality with stronger out-group scape-goating and anti-globalization position-taking than their Center- or Right-party counterparts. This expectation is reinforced by how Left parties disproportionately represent losers of economic globalization compared to non-Left parties (Dutt and Mitra 2005; Burgoon 2012 forthcoming). Both logics provide the basis for a second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2a:

Higher income inequality should, all other things equal, spark stronger anti-globalization position-taking among Left political parties compared to non-Left parties.

In light of the more cultural dimension of Left-Right partisanship – where Right parties, particularly extremist-right and nationalist parties disproportionately embrace traditional national culture and values – Right parties should more readily seize-upon higher economic inequality as a problem justifying retreat from international economic and political engagement, hence sparking anti-globalization positioning. And if party entrepreneurs are mainly opportunistic rather than responding to democratic pressures, inequality may spark anti-globalization po-



sition-taking particularly among extreme-right, nationalist parties with a long profile of championing the national and local. This suggests a second partisan-mediation hypothesis in partial tension with the first:

Hypothesis 2b:

Higher income inequality should, all other things equal, spark stronger anti-globalization position-taking among Right political parties compared to non-Right parties.

This Hypothesis is not fully in tension with Hypothesis 2a, insofar as the extremes of the Left-Right party continuum can include parties responding in line with Hypothesis 2a and 2b, respectively. This would show up, for instance, in extreme left parties (e.g. former Communist parties) *and* extreme Right parties (e.g. right-wing nationalist parties) responding to inequality with the most anti-globalization position-taking, relative to mainstream parties (e.g. Liberal, Social-Democratic, Christian-democratic parties).

Finally, inequality may influence anti-globalization backlash in ways mediated by redistributive tax provisions and social-policy protections that might remedy market-driven inequalities. In particular, pre-tax and pre-transfer income inequality, or gross income inequality, can be expected to spark downstream political mobilization by parties to the extent that the insecurities of individuals are left as is, as it were left to fester. To the extent that social policies actually cushion or compensate for market inequality, they should diminish how much that inequality spurs anti-globalization backlash (Ruggie 1982; Bordo et.al. 2002). Such policies can include redistributive taxes or broad social transfers, but they may also include policies facilitating economic adjustment, such as unemployment insurance providing time and resources to adjust, or active-labor-market programs providing training to adjust. Hence, we have an hypothesis about gross inequality:

Hypothesis 3a:

Higher pre-tax, pre-transfer income inequality should, all other things equal, spark less anti-globalization position-taking to the extent that tax-transfer social policies and taxation systems are redistributive and generous to poorer citizens.

Finally, how much government policies lower gross inequality (captured by the gap between pre- and post-tax-transfer income inequality) may directly signal effectiveness in cushioning the many sources of insecurities, and thereby diminish downstream nationalism. This follows from the converse of the arguments underlying Hypothesis One above: the ability of national policies to redress gross inequalities alleviate economic hardship should




directly diminish scape-goating and anti-globalization backlash among citizens and their partisan representatives.

This provides a basis for a final Hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3b:

Greater redistribution, as shown by the difference between pre-and post-tax-and-transfer income inequality, should, all other things equal, diminish anti-globalization position-taking.



2. Anti-globalization position-taking and Income Inequality in Industrialized Countries

To empirically test these expectations, I analyze how inequality influences the anti-globalization orientation of parties in advanced-industrial democracies. This approach skips-over individual or party-leader sentiments underlying the logic of the Hypotheses above, as well as policy outputs of anti-globalization backlash, such as trade protectionism or national retreat from EU or other international organizations. But the approach focuses on important manifestations of anti-globalization backlash, of intrinsic value in understanding European and globalization politics and relevant to policy outputs in those polities.

The analysis focuses on party platforms of all parties in 22 countries¹ from 1960 to 2008. The data come from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) dataset (and its 2007 and 2010 updates), which measures party position-taking on particular issues by the number of sentences (or quasi-sentences) about an issue as a percentage of total sentences in the manifesto (Budge et.al., 2001; Klingemann et.al.2007; Laver and Garry 2000). The measures capture salience of an issue to a party. But for some issues, the CMP separately measures positive and negative statements about policy, whereby scores gauge priorities of support or opposition to particular programs (Milner and Judkins, 2004). Such measures may canvass party wishes more than do activities in power, where initiatives reflect constraints and demands of coalition partners.² Some research has also found that in various domains manifesto scores predict party behavior in office (Brauninger, 2005; Budge and Hofferbert, 1990; Klingemann et.al., 1994), something emerging from the present data (see below). Using these data, in any event, I can measure party positions on anti-globalization position-taking and estimated this as a function of income inequality to explore and test Hypotheses One through Three.

2.1. Dependent variables: Anti-globalization in Party Platforms

The CMP data provide relevant and systematic measures to offer leverage to quantify anti-globalization across countries, parties, and time, and to judge how traditional party families relate to such position-taking. I construct a composite of support for and opposition to those measured features of platforms that gauge economic and political

1 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.

2 The coded CMP coding may suffer from measurement error and/or unreliability, as some research has shown with respect to subjective coding of the 'left-right' composite (Mikhaylov et al., 2008; Benoit et.al., 2009). However, the scale and implications of this for simpler measures built here remain unclear, and do not disqualify the CMP for systematic appraisal of party support for anti-globalization with broad cross-country and longitudinal coverage.

isolation³: (1) *Net protectionism*, support for and opposition to trade protectionism (per406 and per407, respectively); (2) *Net anti-internationalism*, opposition to and support for international institutions and global engagement (per109 and per107, respectively, in the CMP codes); and (3) and *Net anti-European Union*, opposition to and support for broader and deeper European integration (per110 and per108, respectively). These dimensions of anti-globalization are positively correlated with one another, but not very highly so (see, for instance, Appendix Two, left panel) – a reminder of how position-taking on faces of globalization can and do vary in how they cleave political actors. Unfortunately, the CMP data provide no other measures explicitly focused on support for or opposition to international economic or political influences, such as immigration. Still the pro- and anti-internationalism and protectionism dimensions provide leverage to capture position-taking towards not only a specific economic face of globalization – trade protectionism and free-trade-ism – but also a broader statement of support for European and international institutions and global engagement.

Based on these platforms, all expressed as sentences and quasi-sentences as a percentage of total platform sentences, I construct two composite measures: *Net anti-globalization (narrow)*: $(per406 + per109) - (per407 + per107)$; and *Net anti-globalization (broad)*: $(per406 + per109 + per110) - (per407 + per107 + per108)$. Consistent with the convention in other studies using platform data, I treat the components as additive because they are all on the same salience scale of a party's platform rather than simply related components on different dimensions or scales (e.g. Budge et al 2001; Arzheimer and Carter 2006). In sensitivity checks, I consider other specifications, including measures that standardize the components composing the composites to take alternative account of how parties might give more attention to some aspects of anti-globalization than others. This said, all the above backlash measures vary, in theory, from -100 to +100 percent of a platform, capturing how much a given party in a given election prioritizes anti- versus pro-globalization: Positive values represent net support for anti-globalization, and negative values represent net opposition to such anti-globalization. While intrinsically important to the political climate surrounding globalization in a given party system, such values also correlate positively with measures of policy outputs related to globalization, such as later trade flows or composite measures of actual globalization exposure (see Appendix Two, right panel).


The measures of anti-globalization position-taking vary substantially over time, country, and between parties in a given country-year.⁴ The full sample (1481 party-country-year observations) of *Net anti-globalization (narrow)*, for instance, has a mean of -2.198 (hence, the average party platform tending to be modestly pro-globalization the net). But this masks high sample dispersion (standard deviation of 3.5), ranging from -21.95 (Swedish

³ See Appendix One for a detailed wording of these platform elements.

⁴ Appendix Three provides the summary statistics.

Liberals in 1964 and the Japanese Renewal Party in 1993) – more than 20 percent of platforms being devoted to pro-free trade and internationalism net of any protectionist or anti-internationalist statements – to a maximum of 42.76 (Belgian “Walloon Rally” in 1978).

Figure 1: Anti-globalization positions and Income Inequality (national means, 1980–2008)




2.2. Independent variables: Inequality and controls


Income Inequality. To measure income inequality, I use the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID), based on the United Nations University’s World Income Inequality Database and the Luxembourg Income Study (Solt 2009). The data improve cross-national and over-time comparability of the WIID data among sample countries and provide country-year measures of uncertainty in inequality measures. They provide a strong basis for comparing the OECD countries and years of the CMP data with respect to both pre- and post-tax and transfer income inequality. I focus particularly on the *Net Gini scores*, measures of net income inequality (post tax and transfer), but I also consider the implications of *Gross Gini scores* (pre tax and transfer inequality). For all estimations, I also include the SWIID measures of uncertainty of the country-year scores. The SWIID database also provides measure of tax-and-transfer *Redistribution*, based on the difference between *Gross Gini scores* and *Net Gini scores*, capturing how much market inequality is lowered by redistributive taxes and social-policy

transfers. In sensitivity checks, I also consider other measures of inequality, including the original Deininger and Squire data, and measures of income spread and the structure of inequality, such as 90/50 and 50/10 spreads (Lupu and Pontusson 2011).

The *Net Gini score* range from 19.7 (Sweden in 1982) to 37.25 (Portugal in 2005), with a sample mean of 27.94 (standard deviation 4.1), providing a good basis to explore whether income inequality influences partisan anti-globalization position-taking. To give a very broad sense of how this, Figure 1 captures how the party-system means of *Net Gini scores*, averaged from 1980 to 2008, correlate with party-system means for *Net anti-globalization (broad)*. The expectation, as discussed above, is that this relationship be positive, as is indeed the case, though not significantly so (R-square of .123). A similar story emerges from another descriptive-statistical snapshot of over-time changes in inequality and *Net anti-globalization (broad)* within each of the 22 sample countries (see Appendix Four below). The relevant measure of the relationship between inequality and party position-taking on globalization, of course, takes account the position-taking of different parties across countries and time, and controlling for the influence of other conditions.

Figure 1: Anti-globalization positions and Income Inequality (national means, 1980–2008)





To consider Hypotheses 2 (a and b) and 3 (a and b), I consider measures of two sets of possible mediating conditions: partisan identity and of social-policy generosity and redistribution, respectively. Party identity and partisanship I measure, first, by focusing on seven party families: (1) (Former) Communist parties; (2) Social Democratic parties; (3) Green parties; (4) Christian Democratic parties; (5) Conservative Parties; (6) Liberal parties; and (7) Nationalist extreme-right parties (Lubbers et.al. 2002; Swank and Betz 2003; Mudde 2007; Carter 2005).⁵ I also focus on *Left-to-Right partisanship* that varies across time and party identity, based on the measure developed by Laver and Budge (1992), Laver and Garry (2000), but removing those components constituting this study's measure of *Net anti-globalization* –support for and opposition to internationalism and protectionism. With these changes, I generate a measure of *Right partisanship*, higher scores representing higher priority to Right positions, and lower or negative scores suggesting more priority to Left positions.⁶

To measure social-policy generosity I focus primarily on *Social security transfers* as percentage of GDP (OECD, various years) measure unemployment, social-security, health and other transfers of welfare-state generosity with the best coverage. This measure imperfectly captures generosity, but is a very visible and concrete means by which polities might gauge welfare effort. Between 1960 and 2003, the sample mean is 13 percent, ranging from 3.7 percent (Japan in 1963) to 27.3 percent (Netherlands 1982). I also compare the baseline results using this measure of generosity with measures of unemployment-related spending and of vocational enrolment.

Controls. To address whether inequality influences partisan sentiments on globalization, it is important to control for a range of conditions that plausibly affect inequalities and anti-globalization position-taking. Important controls include the party-family dummies and social security transfers just discussed, but a number of others enter the baseline models. *Trade Flows* are exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP, with a sample mean of 65.6, a minimum of 9.1 and a maximum of 239.8 (Heston et.al. 2002). *Old-age population*, is proportion of the population 65 and older, and can influence entrance into exposed sectors and has been shown to correlate negatively with support for extreme right parties (OECD, various years). *Seats in parliament* capture a party's proportion of seats in parliament in the previous election, measuring how much parties take positions that are genuine policy-making resolutions as opposed to "grand standing" (Sartori, 1976). *GDP growth* captures how business cycles affect economic risks and perspectives of parties on how much globalization to champion (Heston et.al., 2002). *Unemployment rate* captures background socio-economic conditions, net of the simple business cycle, that some studies have found to influence anti- globalization positions (OECD, various). Finally, I consider total number of

5 That last is the most complicated, including not only the CMP coding of "national" or nationalist parties but also parties listed as extreme-right nationalist parties by scholars of such. Where necessary, the parties in question are then coded as 0 for other party families in the default CMP categorization, for instance the Dutch Lijst Pim Fortuyn.


6 *Right partisanship* = (per104 +per201 +per203 +per305 +per401 +per402 +per414 +per505 +per601 +per603 +per605 +per606) - (per103 +per105 +per106 +per403 +per404 +per412 +per413 +per504 +per506 +per701 +per202).

sentences and the percentage un-coded sentences in manifestos to address possible measurement error, on grounds that these capture more difficult-to-code documents.

2.3. Estimation approach

The above parameters constitute an unbalanced panel of party-country-years. The panel is unit-dominated – with some 200 parties in 22 countries as units, and between 2 and 15 elections per party (8 on average) – and the number and spread of years per unit is uneven given the unique spread of elections in different countries. Estimation in light of the multi-level nature of the data should consider how inequality can have country-specific or party-specific effects. The baseline estimations do so via two level random-intercept maximum likelihood models (parties within countries). I lag all right-hand-side country-year measures by one year, to address possible endogeneity and the time it takes parties to absorb political-economic developments.⁷ Given uneven distributions of elections over time, I use a year-count to account for possible trend effects. In robustness tests discussed below I also consider a range of alternative specifications and estimators. Using this broad estimation approach, the first set of models consider the direct effects of inequality on different aspects of anti-globalization positioning, to test Hypothesis One. The second set considers whether partisan identity and orientation mediates the role of inequality, to test Hypotheses 2a and 2b. And the third and final set of models considers the possible mediating role of social-policy generosity and redistribution, to test Hypotheses 3a and 3b.

⁷ Any possible endogeneity due to simultaneity between anti-globalization position-taking and inequality is less likely to emerge, to the extent that the likely tendency of globalization to modestly spur domestic inequality (e.g. Beckfield 2006) would suggest any resulting bias to be negative, that is overstating a negative relationship between *ex ante* inequality and anti-globalization.



3. Results and discussion: Does Inequality Influence Anti-globalization Position-taking?

The main results relevant to Hypothesis One are summarized in Table One. All reported models include the same benchmark estimation of the effects of *Net Gini scores* (post tax and transfer inequality) and the full battery of controls, but focus on different measures of anti-globalization position-taking. Models 1 through 3 consider the components of anti-globalization sentiment: (1) *Net protectionism*; (2) *Net anti-internationalism*; and (3) *Anti-European Union*. Models 4-6, then, summarize results for additive composites of these three measures: Model 4 estimates *Net anti-globalization (narrow)* applied to the full sample of countries. Model 5 estimates *Net anti-globalization (broad)* on the full sample again, even though position-taking on the EU is certainly different for actual or potential members of EU institutions than for non-European polities. Despite such differences, support for EU integration among non-European states can still be construed as an important kind of support for internationalism. Model 6, in any event, reanalyzes *Net anti-globalization (broad)* applied to only European countries.

Across the various estimations, controls perform broadly in line with expectation. The political party-families perform with the recognizable U-shaped distribution across the Left-Right political spectrum – the most anti-globalization parties being the extremes on the left and right, while the strongest supporters of globalization tend to be the Center Left and Right (Burgoon 2011). Larger dependent populations tend to spur support for anti-globalization among parties, as does the rise of service-sector employment (decline of manufacturing and agriculture). Parties with more seats in parliament, and in settings with more female legislators, and in party-systems with more parties, tend to be modestly less anti-globalization. Existing levels of trade openness (net of inequality) tend to have no significant effect on anti-globalization, though is positively signed; and social transfers tend to be negatively signed but insignificant. More surprising is that unemployment levels and GDP growth tend not to significantly alter anti-globalization sentiment in parties – at least net of inequality.

Table 1: Net anti-globalization position-taking and Net Income Inequality

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	NET TRADE PROTECTION	NET ANTI- INT'LISM	NET ANTI-EU	ANTI-GLOB. NARROW (1)+(2)	ANTI-GLOB. BROAD (1)+(2)+(3)	ANTI-GLOB. BROAD (1)+(2)+(3)
GINI INDEX (POST-TAX POST-TRANSFER)	0.026* (0.014)	0.116*** (0.037)	0.067** (0.031)	0.157*** (0.040)	0.221*** (0.052)	0.179*** (0.062)
NATIONALIST-RIGHT	0.215 (0.167)	0.932** (0.388)	1.338*** (0.337)	1.167*** (0.412)	2.508*** (0.556)	2.108*** (0.584)
CONSERVATIVE	-0.234* (0.137)	-0.218 (0.313)	-1.056*** (0.273)	-0.429 (0.333)	-1.533*** (0.451)	-1.854*** (0.541)
LIBERAL	-0.254** (0.129)	-1.089*** (0.298)	-1.302*** (0.259)	-1.293*** (0.316)	-2.624*** (0.428)	-3.187*** (0.473)
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC	-0.043 (0.140)	-1.240*** (0.323)	-1.145*** (0.281)	-1.258*** (0.343)	-2.420*** (0.464)	-2.912*** (0.512)
SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC	0.020 (0.125)	-1.157*** (0.288)	-0.785*** (0.250)	-1.117*** (0.306)	-1.925*** (0.414)	-2.364*** (0.497)
GREEN	-0.099 (0.175)	-1.837*** (0.403)	0.380 (0.351)	-1.927*** (0.429)	-1.553*** (0.579)	-2.077*** (0.629)
(FORMER) COMMUNIST	0.045 (0.133)	-0.149 (0.308)	1.375*** (0.268)	-0.085 (0.328)	1.282*** (0.443)	0.876* (0.487)
TRADE OPENNESS T-1	-0.002 (0.002)	0.015** (0.006)	0.000 (0.005)	0.011 (0.007)	0.013 (0.008)	0.009 (0.009)
SOCIAL TRANSFERS T-1	-0.000 (0.014)	-0.036 (0.035)	0.002 (0.029)	-0.031 (0.037)	-0.019 (0.049)	-0.031 (0.054)
UNEMPLOYMENT T-1	-0.013 (0.012)	0.053 (0.032)	-0.091*** (0.027)	0.023 (0.035)	-0.052 (0.045)	-0.071 (0.048)
GDP GROWTH T-1	0.025 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.041)	0.053 (0.036)	0.008 (0.044)	0.059 (0.059)	-0.018 (0.070)
DEPENDENT POPULATION T-1	5.625*** (2.109)	8.423 (5.527)	-1.001 (4.619)	15.426*** (5.943)	12.099 (7.753)	9.817 (8.943)
SEATS T-1	-0.736*** (0.248)	-0.179 (0.569)	-0.447 (0.496)	-0.861 (0.605)	-1.341 (0.819)	-1.168 (1.033)
WOMEN IN PARLIAMEN T-1	-0.015*** (0.006)	0.001 (0.018)	-0.020 (0.014)	-0.010 (0.019)	-0.035 (0.024)	-0.056** (0.028)
EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTI- EST-1	0.011 (0.034)	-0.240** (0.099)	-0.084 (0.080)	-0.241** (0.107)	-0.258* (0.136)	-0.149 (0.147)
SERVICE EMPLOYMENT T-1	2.253** (0.912)	1.456 (3.402)	5.807** (2.464)	8.377** (3.841)	8.032* (4.355)	1.726 (5.147)
PERCENT UNCODED	-0.002 (0.002)	0.012** (0.005)	0.002 (0.004)	0.012** (0.005)	0.012* (0.007)	0.017** (0.007)
TOTAL SENTENCES (LOG)	-0.085** (0.036)	-0.341*** (0.089)	-0.321*** (0.076)	-0.416*** (0.095)	-0.739*** (0.126)	-0.779*** (0.144)
YEAR	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.028 (0.025)	-0.023 (0.019)	-0.065** (0.027)	-0.054 (0.033)	0.012 (0.038)
GINI UNCERTAINTY	-0.072 (0.059)	-0.300** (0.140)	-0.110 (0.121)	-0.387*** (0.149)	-0.498** (0.200)	-0.514** (0.212)
CONSTANT	12.255 (15.575)	48.269 (47.695)	42.709 (36.801)	117.104** (52.938)	94.930 (63.421)	-28.665 (73.577)
LOG-LIKELIHOOD	-2430.4	-3652.7	-3446.5	-3744.6	-4185.3	-3406.2
OBSERVATIONS	1,472	1,472	1,472	1,472	1,472	1,190
NUMBER OF GROUPS	22	22	22	22	22	17


All models: Maximum-likelihood random-intercept model grouped by country (two-level).

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

The most important finding revealed by the various models is simple: net income inequality tends to increase anti-globalization position-taking. Although the substantive size and significance varies substantially across these anti-globalization measures – something that can be directly compared with the common scales – *Net Gini scores* meet standard thresholds of significance in all the models. The effects are weakest for *Net trade protection* and strongest for *Net anti internationalism*. The results for the composites suggest that inequality’s spurring of anti-globalization are, in a broad sense, additive: the results are stronger for all three models with the composites of anti-globalization, strongest for the full composite *Net anti-globalization (broad)* on the full sample (model 5). These results provide consistent support for the general expectation developed above that net income inequality can meaningfully increase anti-globalization backlash.

Whatever the stability and significance of these effects, their substantive size are meaningful but modest. Figure Two below summarizes such size by focusing on *Net anti-globalization (broad)* in the full sample of parties and countries (model 5 in Table One). Shown are the predicted values of such anti-globalization across the full range of the sample variation in net inequality. Shown also are the 95-percent upper- and lower-confidence intervals in the full distribution (Tomz et.al. 2000).

Figure 2: Anti-globalization positions and Income Inequality (predicted values)



The sample's full variation in net income inequality – ranging from Swedish 1980s inequality to Portugal's 2005 inequality – predicts an increase in *Net anti-globalization* position-taking from -5.6 to about -1, a decrease in support for globalization (increase in “anti-globalization”) that corresponds to moving from roughly the 25th to the 70th percentile of the sample distribution of *Net anti-globalization (broad)*. The increases in globalization that a given country can be expected to undergo judging by the sample experiences, however, suggests an appreciably more modest effect of inequality, with the increase in US inequality in the last decade predicting an increase in *Net anti-globalization* from -2.7 to -1.2 (roughly the 60th to the 65th percentile in the sample distribution of such anti-globalization position-taking). This is modest, to be sure, but not trivial in terms of the sample distribution. How this translates into actual shouting, hemming and hawing about trade, European integration and/or global engagement generally, is more difficult to surmise from these data. But even here, substantial party ink is being spilt on anti-globalization in the face of rising inequality.

Beyond the direct relationship between inequality and anti-globalization position-taking, I also considered a range of ways in which that relationship might be mediated by other forces. Many aspects of such mediation are intuitively plausible but turn out empirically to be very modest or non-existent. For instance, measures of *ex ante* actual exposure to trade, capital, or immigration – or composite measures of such, such as the KOF globalization index (Dreher 2006) – are quite highly correlated with inequality, and in any event do not interact significantly with inequality in shaping anti-globalization. These and many other interactions yield inequality to strongly spur anti-globalization sentiment regardless of most party-specific or national circumstances already presented in Table One.

Table Two, in any event, summarizes the results of testing Hypotheses Two (a) and (b), addressing whether inequality has effects that differ across different kinds of parties with respect to the Left to Right political spectrum. This estimation is accomplished by considering interaction between party-family identity and *Net Gini scores*. Also considered is whether a single measure of *Right partisanship* – based on position-taking by parties in a given election, hence varying also over time – alters the effect of inequalities. As the Table makes clear, however, inequality does not emerge as having very different effects across parties. We do see that inequality is likely to more strongly spur anti-globalization position-taking by Conservative parties than other parties (model 2). And we see that inequality is likely to more strongly spur Net anti-globalization as one moves from Left to Right on *Right partisanship*. These are hints of support for Hypothesis Two (b), but far from uniform. There is, in any event, no support for Hypothesis Two (a), that Left parties might be more likely than Right parties to embrace anti-globalization in the face of inequality.




Table 2: Net anti-globalization position-taking (broad) and Inequality-Partisanship interaction

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
GINI INDEX	0.225***	0.178***	0.202***	0.210***	0.227***	0.210***	0.205***	0.196***
(POST-TAX POST-TRANSFER)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.067)
NATIONALIST-RIGHT	5.462							
	(3.514)							
GINI × NATIONALIST RIGHT	-0.072							
	(0.126)							
CONSERVATIVE		-5.149**						
		(2.369)						
GINI × CONSERV.		0.174**						
		(0.082)						
LIBERAL			-3.037					
			(2.427)					
GINI × LIBERAL			0.047					
			(0.089)					
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC				-1.183				
				(2.408)				
GINI × CHRIST.DEM.				-0.010				
				(0.086)				
SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC					1.228			
					(1.936)			
GINI × SOC.DEM.					-0.072			
					(0.068)			
GREEN						1.390		
						(3.479)		
GINI × GREEN						-0.081		
						(0.126)		
(FORMER) COMMUNIST							1.916	
							(2.246)	
GINI × COMMUNIST							0.023	
							(0.079)	
RIGHT PARTISANSHIP (L-R)								-0.077*
								(0.043)
GINI × RIGHT PARTISANSHIP								0.003**
								(0.002)

Dependent variable: Net anti-globalization (broad)

All models: All non-partisan controls identical to those in Table One (results not shown). Maximum-likelihood random-intercept model grouped by country (two-level).

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Finally, Table Three summarizes results of exploration of Hypotheses Three (a) and (b), about whether inequality's effects are likely to be rendered more modest by redistributive policies. First, I consider whether pre-tax and pre-transfer inequality ("Gross Gini index scores") have less positive or more negative effects for Net anti-globalization in settings where social policies are more generous. Models 1 to 3 in Table Three consider the possible mediating effects of three measures of social-policy protection or generosity: in model (1) social transfers (already in the benchmark models in Table One); in model (2) UI-ALMP, spending on unemployment insurance and active labor market policies as a percentage of GDP (data from OECD 2011) to capture effects of labor-

focused spending; and model (3) *Vocational trainees*, the percentage of secondary-school students enrolled in vocational training programs (data from Lupu and Pontusson 2011). As is clear from all three such tests, the effect of *Gross Gini scores* on anti-globalization are indeed substantially and significantly smaller in times and places where social policy is more generous. These provide broad support for Hypothesis Three (a). Although this is not immediately clear from the tabular results, further analysis of the interaction between inequality and inequality, summarized in Figure Three below, reveals that at any level of social-security transfers below the 49th percentile, inequality significantly increases anti-globalization backlash (broad). Above that level of social protection, however, gross inequality no longer has such a significant positive effect (Brambor et.al. 2005).

Table 3: Net anti-globalization position-taking (broad) and Social policy Redistribution

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
GINI INDEX	0.200**	0.198**	0.175***	
(PRE-TAX PRE-TRANSFER)	(0.088)	(0.099)	(0.062)	
SOCIAL TRANSFERS T-1	0.446*			
	(0.258)			
GINI* SOCIAL TRANSFERS	-0.013**			
	(0.006)			
UI+ALMP T-1		2.495**		
		(1.244)		
GINI* UIALMP		-0.064**		
		(0.028)		
VOCATIONAL TRAINEES T-1			0.183**	
			(0.080)	
GINI* VOCATIONAL TRAINEES			-0.006***	
			(0.002)	
REDISTRIBUTION T-1				-0.065***
(REDUCTION IN GROSS GINI)				(0.025)
OBSERVATIONS	1,472	832	1,239	1,136
NUMBER OF GROUPS	22	22	19	21


Dependent variable: Net anti-globalization (broad)

All models: All non-social-policy controls identical to those in Table One (results not shown).

Maximum-likelihood random-intercept model grouped by country (two-level).

**** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$*

Figure 3: How Social-security transfers reduce the effect of Gross Inequality on Anti-globalization




Second, the Table considers the direct measure actual reduction inequality resulting from all tax and social-policy transfer programs, drawing on the measure of the pre-tax-pre-transfer inequality on the one hand and post-tax-post-transfer inequality on the other (SWIID 2009). Hypothesis Three (b) expects that settings where this reduction in inequality is greater are settings that are less likely to have parties embracing anti-globalization backlash. This is, indeed, what emerges from the data, as model 4 summarizes. We have, hence, support also for Hypothesis Three (b).

All these reported results are robust to a range of alternative specifications and estimators. First, they hold up to removing any or all right-hand side controls; adding other specifications of controls (e.g. other measures of globalization, like the KOF index, capital openness or immigration); running the models with fixed country or party-family effects; removing outliers in the anti-globalization backlash or inequality measures; removing (step-wise) any one country from the sample (or jack-knifing standard errors).

Second, the results hold upon looking at other measures of anti-globalization positioning. This applies to focusing on only the protectionism, anti-internationalism, or anti-EU without taking further account of pro-free-trade, pro-internationalism, or pro-EU statements. The results are virtually identical using other measurements of composite *Net anti-globalization*, for instance standardizing the components before their addition, whereby the

relatively greater platform attention to (for instance) the EU does not drive results. Third, similar results emerge from alternative measures of inequality, such as the raw WIID database on Gini or p90/p10 spreads, despite their problems with cross-national and/or longitudinal comparability. And study of the structure of inequality – such as inequality at the upper-end of the distribution relative to the median, as opposed to inequality at the lower-end of the distribution relative to the median – reveals that particularly upper-register inequality spurs anti-globalization. This is not surprising given that such inequality is what has most grown in recent decades in OECD settings.

Third, the results are robust to alternative estimators. Results are very similar in random-coefficient, random-intercept models, where such models converge. They are also very similar in other embedding structures of multi-level models, such as three-level models of parties within party families within countries, or of parties within a given election-year of a country. The results are also robust to OLS fixed effects with clustering of standard errors by country, FGLS, panel-corrected standard errors, and lagged dependent variables. Such insensitivity and robustness to the basic patterns suggest that the messages emerging from Tables One to Three are not simple artifacts of statistical technique.




4. Conclusion

This study has explored whether and under what conditions income inequality influences party position-taking on anti-globalization backlash. The theoretical insights focus on the possibilities that domestic inequality, whatever its origins, can spark feelings of insecurity and deprivation, and in turn unleash attribution or scapegoating of out-groups that manifest themselves in anti-globalization backlash. The empirical inquiry focused on extensive information about the position-taking of political parties in OECD countries since 1960, combined with comparable data on income inequalities, and on a range of political economic conditions relevant to anti-globalization politics. The principal finding has been that income inequalities, left unchecked by social-policy protections, do indeed tend to spur protectionism, anti-internationalism, and anti-EU backlash in the position-taking of parties. Such responses appear to hold net of a wide range of other background conditions, and appear to hold regardless of *ex ante* openness, party color, or other political-economic conditions. An important finding, however, is that such effects need not and are not always left unchecked. Redistributive social policies and other provisions appear in the above analysis to cushion how inequality plays out for globalization politics. Pre-tax and pre-transfer inequality has substantively stronger spurring effects for anti-globalization backlash when *ex ante* social policies are modest than when such policies are generous.

These findings should be seen as part of a larger research agenda focused on socio-economy of anti-globalization backlash. Further inquiry should develop and explore other measures and manifestations of anti-globalization backlash among parties – beyond anti-EU integration, trade protectionism, and international engagement generally. It should also focus on the implications of inequality that are up- and down-stream from the party-positioning investigated here. More upstream are the individual and group attitudes and interactions that inequality plausibly unleashes – for instance in studies of public opinion on subjective insecurities and economic hardship, and on European integration, anti-immigration, and nationalism. And more downstream might be studies of how inequality and party-positioning on anti-globalization affect protectionist or nationalist policies of nation states. The present study, however, provides important information on inequality and globalization politics: It not only adds an important consequence to the litany of known problems emerging from inequality, but also suggests the agency of government policies to mitigate that consequence.





References

- Alesina A, Di Tella R, MacCulloch R (2004) Inequality and happiness: are Europeans and Americans different? *Journal of Public Economics* 88(9-10): 2009-2042.
- Anderson C J, and Singer M M (2008) The sensitive Left and the impervious Right: Multilevel models and the politics of inequality, ideology, and legitimacy in Europe. *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (4-5): 564-599.
- Arzheimer K and Carter E (2006) Political opportunity structures and right-wing extremist party success, *European Journal of Political Research* 45: 419-443.
- Beckfield J (2006) European integration and income inequality. *American Sociological Review* 71: 964-85.
- Bell L and Freeman R (2001) The incentive for working hard: Explaining hours worked differences in the US and Germany. *Labour Economics* 8(2): 181-202.
- Betz H-G (1994) *Radical right-wing populism in Western Europe*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Bilal S, Grether J-M, De Melo J (2003) Determinants of attitudes towards immigration: a trade-theoretic approach. *Review of international economics* 11: 253-267.
- Bordo M, Eichengreen B and Irwin D (2002) Is globalization today really different than globalization a hundred years ago? NBER Working Paper W7195.
- Bradley D, Huber E, Moller S, Nielsen F, Stephens J D (2003) Distribution and redistribution in postindustrial democracies. *World Politics* 55(2): 193-228
- Brambor T, Clark W, and Golder M (2005) Understanding interaction models: Improving empirical analyses. *Political Analysis* 13: 1-20.
- Bräuninger T (2005) A partisan model of government expenditure. *Public Choice* 125: 409-429.
- Brown R (1988). *Group processes*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
- Budge I, and Hofferbert R I (1990) Mandates and policy outputs: U.S. party platforms and federal expenditures. *American Political Science Review* 84: 111-131.
- Budge I, Klingemann H, Volkens A, Bara J, and Tannenbaum E (2001) *Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors and Governments, 1945-98*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Burgoon B (2012 forthcoming) Partisan embedding of liberalism: How trade, investment and immigration affect party support for the welfare state. *Comparative Political Studies* 45 (5).
- < ----- > (2011) Partisanship and anti-globalization backlash. Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Canada. March 2011.
- < ----- > . (2009a) Globalization and backlash: Polanyi's revenge? *Review of International Political Economy* 16 (2): 145-177.
- < ----- > . (2009b) Social nation, social Europe: Support for welfare compensation in Europe. *European Union Politics* 10(4): 427-55.
- Burns J K (2008) Xenophobia—evolved ‘outgroup’ hatred or product of a toxic social environment? *South African Journal of Psychiatry*.
- Carter E (2005) *The Extreme Right in Western Europe: Success or Failure*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.

- Chamlin M B and Cochran J K (2006) Economic inequality, legitimacy, and cross-national homicide rates. *Homicide Studies* 10(4). 231–52.
- Coenders M and Scheepers P (1998). Support for ethnic discrimination in the Netherlands, 1979–1993: Effects of period, cohort and individual characteristics. *European Sociological Review* 14: 405–422.
- Crush J and Pendleton W (2007) Mapping hostilities: the geography of xenophobia in Southern Africa. *South African Geographical Journal* 89(1): 64–82.
- Daly M, Wilson M, and Vasdev S (2001) Income inequality and homicide rates in Canada and the United States. *Canadian Journal of Criminology*: 219–236.
- De la Rey C (1991) Intergroup relations: theories and positions. In Foster D and Louw-Potgieter J (Eds) *Social Psychology in South Africa*. Isando: Lexicon: 27–56.
- Dollard J, Doob L, Miller N E, Mowrer O, and Sears R (1939) *Frustration and aggression*. New Haven, C T Yale University Press.
- Douglas T (1995) *Scapegoats: Transferring Blame*. New York: Routledge press.
- Dreher A (2006) Does globalization affect growth? Evidence from a new index of Globalization. *Applied Economics* 38(10): 1091–1110.
- Duckitt, J (1994) *The social psychology of prejudice*. Westport, C T Praeger.
- Dutt P and Mitra D (2005) Political ideology and endogenous trade policy: an empirical investigation. *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 87(1): 59–72.
- Favell A and Guiraudon V (2009) The sociology of the European Union: an agenda. *European Union Politics* 10: 550–576.
- Gerritsen D and Lubbers M (2010) Unknown is unloved? Diversity and inter-population trust in Europe. *European Union Politics* 2010 11: 267–287.
- Glick P (ed) (2005) *On the Nature of Prejudice*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing.
- Green D P, Glaser J, Rich A (1998a) From lynching to gay bashing: The elusive connection between economic conditions and hate crime. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 75(1): 82–92.
- Green, D P, Strolovitch D Z, and Wong J S (1998b) Defended neighborhoods, integration, and racially motivated crime. *American Journal of Sociology* 104 (2): 372–403.
- Hays J, Ehrlich S, and Peinhardt C (2005) Government spending and public support for trade in the OECD: a test of the embedded liberalism thesis. *International Organization* 59:473–94.
- Helpman E, Itskhoki O, Redding S (2008) Inequality and unemployment in a global economy. NBER Working Paper No. 14478.
- Heston A, Summers R, and Aten B (2002) Penn world table version 6.1, Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP).
- Hewstone, Fincham, Jaspars. (1983) *Attribution Theory and Research: Conceptual Developmental and Social Dimensions*. Academic Press.
- Hobolt S B and Lablond P (2009) Economic insecurity and support for the Euro, mimeo.
- Jackman R W, and Volpert K (1996) Conditions favouring parties of the extreme Right in Western Europe. *British Journal of Political Science* 26: 501–521.
- Kapstein E (1996) Workers in the world economy. *Foreign Affairs* 75:16–37.




- Kelley H H (1967) *Attribution Theory in Social Psychology*. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 15: 192-238.
- Kitschelt H (1995) *The Radical Right in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Kitschelt H and Hellemans S (1990) The Left-Right semantics and the new politics cleavage. *Comparative Political Studies* 23(2): 210-238.
- Klingemann H-D, Hofferbert R, and Budge I (1994) *Parties, Policies and Democracy*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Klingemann H-D, Volkens A, Bara J, Budge I and McDonald M D (2007) *Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments in Eastern Europe, European Union, and OECD 1990-2003*. Oxford University Press.
- Knigge P (1998) The ecological correlates of right-wing extremism in Western Europe. *European Journal of Political Research* 34: 249-279.
- Krueger A B and Pischke J-S (1997) A Statistical Analysis of Crime against Foreigners in Unified Germany. *Journal of Human Resources* 32(1): 182-209.
- Laver M and Budge I (eds) (1992) *Party Policies and Government Coalitions*. London: Macmillan.
- Laver M J and Garry J (2000) Estimating policy positions from political texts. *American Journal of Political Science* 44 (3): 619-634.
- Lubbers M, Gijsberts M and Scheepers P (2002) Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe. *European Journal of Political Research* 41: 345-378.
- Lubbers M and Scheepers P (2000) Individual and contextual characteristics of the German extreme right-wing vote in the 1990s: A test of complementary theories. *European Journal of Political Research* 38: 63-94.
- Lupu N and Pontusson J (2011) The structure of inequality and the politics of redistribution. *American Political Science Review* 105 (2): 316-336.
- Mayhew D (1974) *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- McLaren, L (2006) *Identity, interests and attitudes to European integration*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Milner H and Judkins B (2004) Partisanship, trade policy, and globalization: Is there a Left-Right divide on trade policy? *International Studies Quarterly* 48:95-119.
- Morris A (1998) Our fellow Africans make our lives hell: The lives of Congolese and Nigerians living in Johannesburg. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21 (6): 1116-36.
- Mudde C (2007) *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Netjes C E and Edwards E (2006) Taking Europe to its extremes: Examining cueing effects of Right-Wing populist parties on public opinion regarding European integration. Best.-Nr. SP IV 2005-202 Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB).
- O'Connell M F (2005) Economic forces and anti-immigrant attitudes in Western Europe : a paradox in search of an explanation. *Patterns of Prejudice* 39 (1): 60-74.
- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2002) Social Expenditures Database. www.sourceoecd.org.
- <----->. Various years. *Historical Statistics*. www.sourceoecd.org.

- Poppe E (2001) Effects of changes in GNP and perceived group characteristics on national and ethnic stereotypes in Central and Eastern Europe. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 31 (8): 1689–1708.
- Rodrik D (1997) *Has Globalization Gone Too Far?* Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.
- Rothstein B and Uslaner E M (2005) All for all: Equality, corruption, and social trust. *World Politics* 58:4172.
- Ruggie J G (1982) International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order. *International Organization* 36:195-231.
- Runciman W G (1966) *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice*. London, UK: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Sánchez-Cuenca I (2000) The political basis of support for European integration, *European Union Politics* 1(2): 147-171.
- Sartori G (1976) *Parties and Party Systems*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Solt F (2009) Standardizing the World Income Inequality Database. *Social Science Quarterly* 90(2): 231-242.
- Steenbergen M R, Edwards E E, and De Vries C E (2007) Who's cueing whom?: Mass-elite linkages and the future of European integration. *European Union Politics* 8: 13-35.
- Swank D (2002) *Global Capital, Political Institutions, and Policy Change in Developed Welfare States*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- <----->, and Betz H-G (2003) Globalization, the welfare state, and Right wing populism in Western Europe. *Socio-Economic Review* 1: 215-45.
- Tajfel H (1981) *Human groups and social categories*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Tanasoiu C and Colonescu C (2008) Determinants of Support for European Integration : The Case of Bulgaria. *European Union Politics* 9: 363.
- Taylor D and Jaggi V (1974) Ethnocentrism and causal attribution in a South Indian context. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 5: 162-171.
- Tomz M, King G, and Wittenberg J. (2000) Making the most of statistical analyses: improving interpretation and presentation.' *American Journal of Political Science* 44:347-361.
- Traca D A (2005) Globalization, wage volatility, and the welfare of workers. *Review of International Economics* 13: 237-249.
- Tshitereke C (1999) Xenophobia and relative deprivation. *Crossings* 3 (2): 4--5.
- Uslaner E M (2002) *The Moral Foundations of Trust*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Van der Brug W, and Van Spanje J (2009) Immigration, Europe and the 'new' cultural dimension. *European Journal of Political Research* 48 (3): 309-334.
- Veugelers J and Magnan A (2005) Conditions of far-right strength in contemporary Western Europe: an application of Kitschelt's theory. *European Journal of Political Research* 44: 837-60.
- Weaver K R (1987) The politics of blame avoidance. *Journal of Public Policy* 6(4): 371-398.
- Weiner B (1992) *Human Motivation: Metaphors, Theories and Research*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
- Wilkinson R (2004) Why is violence more common where inequality is greater? *Ann N Y Acad Sci* 1036: 1-12.
- Wilkinson R G and Pickett K E (2006) Income inequality and population health: A review and explanation of the evidence. *Social Science & Medicine* 62(7): 1768–84.



Wood A (1995) *North-South trade, employment, and inequality: Changing fortunes in a skill-driven world*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.






GINI Discussion Papers

Recent publications of GINI. They can be downloaded from the website www.gini-research.org under the subject Papers.

- DP 13** **The Social Stratification of Social Risks. Class and Responsibility in the 'New' Welfare State**
Olivier Pintelon, Bea Cantillon, Karel Van den Bosch and Christopher T. Whelan
September 2011
- DP 12** **Factor Components of Inequality. A Cross-Country Study**
Cecilia García-Peñalosa and Elsa Orgiazzi
July 2011
- DP 11** **An Analysis of Generational Equity over Recent Decades in the OECD and UK**
Jonathan Bradshaw and John Holmes
July 2011
- DP 10** **Who Reaps the Benefits? The Social Distribution of Public Childcare in Sweden and Flanders**
Wim van Lancker and Joris Ghysels
June 2011
- DP 9** **Comparable Indicators of Inequality Across Countries (Position Paper)**
Brian Nolan, Ivo Marx and Wiemer Salverda
March 2011
- DP 8** **The Ideological and Political Roots of American Inequality**
John E. Roemer
March 2011
- DP 7** **Income distributions, inequality perceptions and redistributive claims in European societies**
István György Tóth and Tamás Keller
February 2011
- DP 6** **Income Inequality and Participation: A Comparison of 24 European Countries + Appendix**
Bram Lancee and Herman van de Werfhorst
January 2011
- DP 5** **Household Joblessness and Its Impact on Poverty and Deprivation in Europe**
Marloes de Graaf-Zijl
January 2011
- DP 4** **Inequality Decompositions – A Reconciliation**
Frank A. Cowell and Carlo V. Fiorio
December 2010
- DP 3** **A New Dataset of Educational Inequality**
Elena Meschi and Francesco Scervini
December 2010
- DP 2** **Are European Social Safety Nets Tight Enough? Coverage and Adequacy of Minimum Income Schemes in 14 EU Countries**
Francesco Figari, Manos Matsaganis and Holly Sutherland
June 2011
- DP 1** **Distributional Consequences of Labor Demand Adjustments to a Downturn. A Model-based Approach with Application to Germany 2008–09**
Olivier Bargain, Herwig Immervoll, Andreas Peichl and Sebastian Sieglöcher
September 2010





Information on the GINI project

Aims

The core objective of GINI is to deliver important new answers to questions of great interest to European societies: What are the social, cultural and political impacts that increasing inequalities in income, wealth and education may have? For the answers, GINI combines an interdisciplinary analysis that draws on economics, sociology, political science and health studies, with improved methodologies, uniform measurement, wide country coverage, a clear policy dimension and broad dissemination.

Methodologically, GINI aims to:

- exploit differences between and within 29 countries in inequality levels and trends for understanding the impacts and teasing out implications for policy and institutions,
- elaborate on the effects of both individual distributional positions and aggregate inequalities, and
- allow for feedback from impacts to inequality in a two-way causality approach.

The project operates in a framework of policy-oriented debate and international comparisons across all EU countries (except Cyprus and Malta), the USA, Japan, Canada and Australia.

Inequality Impacts and Analysis

Social impacts of inequality include educational access and achievement, individual employment opportunities and labour market behaviour, household joblessness, living standards and deprivation, family and household formation/breakdown, housing and intergenerational social mobility, individual health and life expectancy, and social cohesion versus polarisation. Underlying long-term trends, the economic cycle and the current financial and economic crisis will be incorporated. Politico-cultural impacts investigated are: Do increasing income/educational inequalities widen cultural and political 'distances', alienating people from politics, globalisation and European integration? Do they affect individuals' participation and general social trust? Is acceptance of inequality and policies of redistribution affected by inequality itself? What effects do political systems (coalitions/winner-takes-all) have? Finally, it focuses on costs and benefits of policies limiting income inequality and its efficiency for mitigating other inequalities (health, housing, education and opportunity), and addresses the question what contributions policy making itself may have made to the growth of inequalities.

Support and Activities

The project receives EU research support to the amount of Euro 2.7 million. The work will result in four main reports and a final report, some 70 discussion papers and 29 country reports. The start of the project is 1 February 2010 for a three-year period. Detailed information can be found on the website.

www.gini-research.org





GINI GROWING INEQUALITIES' IMPACTS

Amsterdam Institute for Advanced labour Studies

University of Amsterdam

Plantage Muidergracht 12 1018 TV Amsterdam The Netherlands

Tel +31 20 525 4199 Fax +31 20 525 4301

gini@uva.nl www.gini-research.org



Project funded under the
Socio-Economic sciences
and Humanities theme.